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CONFLICTED NORMATIVE POWER EUROPE
Abstract
This paper will evaluate the extent to which the European Union (EU) manifests the 
ability to act as, and possesses the potential to develop into, a norm-setting bureaucracy 
in its external relations when it comes to the protection and promotion of sexual minority 
rights. In order to examine this, an extensive overview of the academic debate on the 
theoretical notion of Normative Power Europe, as developed by Ian Manners, is offered. 
Subsequently, the historical development of the Union’s internal policies related to the 
rights of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) community is briefly 
outlined. This is followed by an evaluation of the EU’s international identity regarding 
LGBT rights. Ultimately it is concluded that the ability of the EU to shape international 
norms and values concerning this policy issue is severely undercut by a set of internal, 
institutional, instrumental and conceptual inconsistencies. Only by overcoming this 
confliction and inconsonance can the EU develop into a full-fledged, credible and 
effective normative power in the case of sexual minority rights. It is concluded that the 
recently launched LGBT toolkit could constitute an important step in this direction.
Die vorliegende Arbeit bemüht sich um ein Urtel darüber, inwieweit die Europäische 
Union (EU) fähig ist, in ihren Außenbeziehungen in Angelegenheiten des Schutzes und 
der Förderung der Rechte sexueller Minderheiten als normsetzende Bureakratie zu 
agieren, bzw. das Potential besitzt, sich dazu zu entwickeln. Um dies zu erforschen, wird 
ein breiter Überblick über die wissenschaftliche Debatte zur Theorie der Normative 
Power Europe (Normmacht Europa) von Ian Manners geboten. Danach wird die 
historische Entwicklung der Unionsinnenpolitik in Bezug auf die Rechte von lesbischen, 
homosexuellen, bisexuellen und transgender Personen (lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender – LGBT) kurz umrissen. Darauf folgt eine Bewertung der internationalen 
Position der EU im Hinblick auf LGBT Rechte. Die Arbeit kommt zu dem Schluss, dass 
die Fähigkeit der EU, Normen und Werte der diesbezüglichen Politik auf internationaler 
Ebene zu gestalten, durch eine Reihe interner, institutioneller, instrumenteller und 
konzeptioneller Widersprüche schwer beeinträchtigt ist. Erst mit der Überwindung dieser 
Ungereimtheiten kann sich die EU zu einer vollwertigen, glaubwürdigen und effektiven 
Normmacht in Angelegenheiten der Rechte sexueller Minderheiten entwickeln. De jüngst 
beschlossene LGBT Maßnahmenkatalog schließlich könnte einen wichtigen Schritt in 
diese Richtung darstellen. 
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1. Introduction
On 17 May 2010, which marked the sixth International Day against Homophobia and 
Transphobia (IDAHO)1, a chorus of high-ranking European Union (EU) officials formed to 
condemn discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity in a series 
of similar-sounding statements, which simultaneously stressed the advances that had 
already been made in and by the EU:
“ The European Union can take some pride in being at the vanguard of combating 
homophobia and other forms of prejudice and discrimination.”2
“The European Union is deeply concerned by the violations of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms based on sexual orientation or gender identity wherever they 
occur [...]. This forms an integral part of the EU Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, where several measures have been taken [...].”3
“The Lisbon Treaty consolidated our commitment to defending human rights and it 
allows the EU to speak with a single voice on the international scene. The European 
Parliament should continue to affirm its strong opposition to homophobia, no matter 
whether it takes place inside or outside the EU.”4
“The EU is also very active in the international arena, in bilateral as well as 
multilateral fora such as the United Nations. In these fora, it pursues a determined 
policy of opposing homophobic actions and campaigns for the decriminalisation of 
homosexual relations.”5
Suggestive of a position of moral ascendancy, these statements give the impression that 
the EU is in the vanguard of institutionalising and promoting sexual minority rights. Not 
only do all EU representatives stress the importance of human dignity and how 
homophobia constitutes a breach thereof, their statements are also rife with references 
to the principles, articles and legal documents upon which the EU is founded. This form 
1 It also marked the twentieth anniversary of the decision of the World Health Organisation to remove 
homosexuality from its list of diseases. The date of IDAHO has been set to commemorate this decision 
made on 17 May 1990. 
2 European Council (2010)
3 Council of the European Union (2010a)
4 European Parliament (2010c)
5 European Commission (2010a)
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of declaratory politics might, therefore, lead one to conclude that Europe is playing, or 
aspiring to play, the role of a leading norm-setting bureaucracy in the global arena.
Furthermore, the EU’s condemnation of the violation of the human rights of LGBT people 
seems to have received support on 1 December 2009, when the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (CFR) became legally binding upon all member states, 
when implementing Community legislation, with the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon6. Article 21 of the Charter expressly prohibits “any discrimination” based on, inter 
alia, sexual orientation7. Because the CFR forms an integral part of the Lisbon Treaty8, 
the latter has become the first international treaty which explicitly prohibits this type of 
discrimination. As such, it appears that the EU has moved beyond empty rhetoric and is 
now leading by example.
This situates the EU’s external policies on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender 
(LGBT)9 issues within the framework of Normative Power Europe (NPE). Developed by 
Ian Manners in the early 2000s, NPE represents a move away from more conventional 
interpretations of Europe’s international sway. According to this perspective, the EU’s 
ability to get external actors to do what it wants is not derived from a military force de 
frappe, as is commonly argued by realist conceptions of power, nor is it entirely borne 
out of economic might, as is assumed by the Civilian Power Europe (CPE) concept. 
Instead, proponents of NPE postulate that, in some policy areas or issues, the EU plays 
a leading role because the norms and values it holds are morally persuasive in and of 
themselves. There is thus arguably no need for military or economic pressure in order to 
shape other countries’ policies, suggesting a veiled form of power.
The controversial claim that “the EU has been, is and always will be a normative power 
in world politics” was put forward by Manners with the aim “to promote normative 
6 While the official name of this document is the ‘Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union 
and the Treaty establishing the European Community’, the short version will be referred to throughout this 
thesis. 
7 European Communities (2000)
8 This becomes clear from Article 6 of the Treaty of Lisbon, which states that “the Union recognises the 
rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union […], 
which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties”. 
9 Even though it could be argued that LGBT rights are not entirely synonymous with sexual minority rights, 
they will be used interchangeably throughout the text for the sake of simplicity. Whenever the two sets of 
rights are treated in a distinct way, this will be made explicit.  
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approaches to the study of the EU in world politics”10. The importance of research on the 
Union’s normative role was underlined when fellow academics voted Manners’ 2002 
article as one of the most influential academic works ever published on European 
integration11. Whitman claims that Manners’ thesis “needs to be complemented by more 
rigorous accounts of the capabilities of the EU”12. Taking up these calls, several scholars 
have critically appraised the core principles of NPE at the theoretical as well as the 
empirical level. The applicability of the framework to the EU’s international role 
concerning sexual minority rights, however, has not yet been subjected to academic 
scrutiny. In fact, while a limited number of authors have written on the development and 
status of sexual minority rights within Europe13, scholarly work that centres upon the 
external dimension of this policy area itself is wanting. As Kollman and Waites note, “the 
study of LGBT human rights politics” is “almost non-existent in the discipline of politics”14. 
This paper seeks to fill these lacunae by taking the intersection of ethics and policy-
making in casu sexual minority rights as a the starting point. It is particularly inspired by 
Diez’ plea to subject “the projection of European norms and values” to “continuous 
deconstruction through the exposition of contradictions within this discourse, and 
between this discourse and other practices”15. To this end, the objectives of this paper 
are threefold: to provide a comprehensive outline of the literature on Normative Power 
Europe, to capsulise the development of both internal and external LGBT policies at the 
European level, and to evaluate the applicability of the normative power label to the 
Union’s external relations in the field of sexual minority rights. More concretely, this 
paper sets out to evaluate the extent to which the EU manifests the ability to act as, and 
possesses the potential to develop into, a normative power with regards to sexual 
minority rights. In order to answer this question, the text has been structured into three 
core parts.
In the first section, Ian Manners’ theoretical framework of Normative Power Europe will 
be laid out. To begin with, NPE will be situated within the historical context out of which it 
10 Manners, I. (2008), p. 65. 
11 Peterson, J. (2008), p. 65.
12 Whitman, R. (2002), p. 11.
13 See, for example, Beger (2004), Kochenov (2007, 2009), Swiebel (2009), Swiebel & Van der Veur (2009), 
Waaldijk & Clapham (1993), Weyembergh & Cârstocea (2006).
14 Kollman, K. & Waites, M. (2009), p. 2.
15 Diez, T. (2005), p. 636.
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sprang up. Manners’ concept is a relatively recent addition to the scholarly debate on the 
international identity of the EU, which, until the 2000s, was eclipsed by the antagonism 
between the notion of Civilian Power Europe and more traditional realist views. 
Following this historical overview, the core tenets and propositions of NPE will be dealt 
with extensively. The section will be concluded by looking at the academic status quo 
related to the Union as a normative actor, which consists of an evaluation of critiques at 
both the theoretical and the empirical level.
The second section focuses on the EU’s political discourses and actual policies 
regarding sexual minority rights. It will thus draw heavily from official documents, 
statements, speeches and policy papers. The chapter has been subdivided into two 
parts. While the first half centres upon the development of LGBT policies within the 
Union, the latter addresses the external dimension of this policy area. It is important to 
note here that the EU will not be treated as a monolithic entity. Instead, this paper 
agrees with Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks’ perception of the EU as an exemplar of 
multi-level governance (MLG)16, and thus assumes that the sui generis character of the 
Union is at odds with the conventional separation of the domestic from the international 
political realm. In lieu thereof, it is acknowledged that the two realms, together with local 
and regional levels as well as non-governmental actors, are enmeshed in such a way as 
to give rise to a complex network of interaction. Within this network, the nodes are made 
up by the institutional actors, which are located at different spatial levels. Concerning 
sexual minority rights, this means that the analysis will not be limited to the traditional 
centres of academic investigation (i.e. the Council, Commission, Parliament and the 
European Court of Justice), but will also incorporate actors such as the European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), the European Parliament’s Intergroup on LGBT 
Rights (LGBT-EP) and the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans- and Intersex 
Association (ILGA). In short, by being attuned to the “multiperspectival institutional 
forms” of the European polity17, it becomes possible to analyse the differences and 
similarities in policy approaches to and statements on sexual minority rights across this 
vast spectrum of EU institutional actors.  
16 Hooghe, L. & Marks, G. (2001)
17 Ruggie, J. G. (1993), p. 172
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The third section will then combine insights from the preceding parts, by investigating the 
fit between theoretical conceptions of the EU as a principled Maecenas of sexual 
minority rights and the practical reality of policy-making. It will become evident that the 
ability of the Union to credibly shape international norms and values regarding sexual 
minority rights is severely undercut by four types of inconsistencies. Internally, the 
LGBT-related rights situation varies greatly across the member states, giving a 
bittersweet double meaning to the Union’s motto of Unity in diversity. For example, while 
countries such as Sweden and the Netherlands are generally seen as clear frontrunners, 
LGBT people’s right to freedom of assembly is consistently violated in Latvia, Lithuania 
and Poland18. Institutionally, the Union has failed to act as a cohesive organisation when 
it comes to safeguarding and promoting LGBT rights. Although the European Parliament 
is generally seen as a staunch ally of sexual minorities, the track record of the 
Commission, the Council and especially the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is 
considerably more equivocal. Instrumentally, the Union is not solely relying upon the 
convincing nature of its cosmopolitan arguments. Instead, normative reasoning is 
frequently combined with other, mostly economic forms of power, giving rise to a blend 
of NPE and CPE. Finally, the EU seems conceptually conflicted in its approach to LGBT 
rights, for it fails to adopt a consistent definition of sexual minorities. In some cases, 
references are made to LGBT as a whole, whereas at other times sexual orientation (i.e. 
Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual, or LGB) is differentiated from gender identity (transgender). 
It even occurs that bisexuals are treated differently in EU legislation and discourses from 
homosexual men and women. In short, the Union is internally, institutionally, 
instrumentally and conceptually conflicted in its approach to sexual minority rights.
From this, it can be concluded that the performance of the Union with regards to sexual 
minority rights is currently not in line with the tenets of Normative Power Europe. 
Moreover, the EU can only develop into a full-fledged, credible and effective norm-
setting bureaucracy in this policy area if it manages to overcome the contradictions and 
inconsonance it is riddled with. In sum, while the EU manifests some aspects of NPE in 
the case of sexual minority rights, and while it could develop into a more mature 
normative actor, as is suggested by the recent launch of the LGBT toolkit, it is currently 
best described as a conflicted normative power19. 
18 ILGA-Europe (2010a)
19 Cf. Meunier and Nicolaïdis (2006), who describe the EU as a conflicted trade power.
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2. Normative Power Europe
In theorising on the influence the European Union holds in international affairs, the 
notion of Normative Power Europe developed out of, and in reaction to, more traditional 
views that define the EU’s international role in predominantly military or civilian terms. 
This is not to suggest a linear evolution from Realist Power Europe (RPE) into CPE and 
ultimately into NPE; these different conceptions of power not only overlap, but in practice 
frequently even interplay. Rather, while it is acknowledged that different conceptions of 
power continue to coexist, the idea behind the normative framework is that norms and 
values have become a relatively more eminent part of the EU’s international identity. The 
emphasis has thus shifted away from security and defence matters onto the trade realm 
and subsequently onto “the ability to define what passes for ‘normal’ in world politics”20. It 
is this norm-setting ability that Ian Manners considers to be the defining feature of NPE, 
and what Nicolaïdis and Howse term “the ultimate form of soft power”21. 
This historical background of NPE forms the starting point of this chapter. After this 
normative perspective has been contrasted with its military and civilian counterparts, the 
framework’s core tenets will be explored in order to uncover how the EU can have an 
ideational impact in the world. From this it will become clear exactly what norms are 
supposedly being upheld and promoted by the EU. That the notion of NPE is not without 
its detractors becomes clear from the concluding part of this chapter, which will 
distinguish between theoretical and empirical critiques.
The Historical  Background to Normative Power Europe  
That the framework of Normative Power Europe should be analysed in connection with 
the debate on the EU’s military and civilian power which engulfed many scholars in the 
1970s and 1980s is indicated by the title of the foundational article in which Ian Manners 
developed the idea of NPE, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” 22. 
This title refers directly to the title of the 1982 article23 in which Hedley Bull, the leading 
Australian academic of the English School of International Relations (IR), discredited 
20 Manners, I. (2002), p. 236
21 Nicolaïdis, K. & Howse, R. (2002), p. 770.
22 Manners, I. (2002)
23 Bull, H. (1982)
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François Duchêne’s concept of Civilian Power Europe. In fact, it is Bull’s claim that 
“’Europe’ is not an actor in international affairs, and does not seem likely to become 
one”24 that Manners ultimately sets out to disprove through conceiving of the EU as an 
ideational actor. By arguing that developments in world politics in the last decade of the 
millennium significantly shifted the balance between the military, civilian and normative 
dimensions of power in the latter’s favour, Manners suggests that Bull’s military focus 
and Duchêne’s civilian conception have become outdated and that it is not, or no longer, 
a contradiction in terms to call the EU a normative power.
In developing the concept of CPE, François Duchêne reconceptualised international 
power structures by stressing the pre-eminence of economic interdependence and, by 
implication, heralding in the decline of conventional power politics. His belief that 
“economic interests are in the driving seat”25 betrays the journalist and political analyst’s 
close relationship with Jean Monnet, the man who is commonly seen as the architectural 
visionary behind the process of European integration. The sui generis form of political 
co-operation that was continuously being shaped and intensified through the so-called 
Monnet method convinced Duchêne that economic entanglement had supplanted 
balance-of-power reasoning in world politics; his writings suggested the demilitarising of 
international political discourses by stressing mutual, often trade-based solutions to 
common problems, illustrating how the world was experiencing “a sea change in the 
sources of power”26. In fact, Duchêne’s evident admiration for Monnet even caused The 
Independent to refer to him as the European statesman’s “amanuensis” in its 2005 
obituary of Duchêne27, thus indicating the fuzziness of the boundary between political 
theory and praxis in the analyst’s writing.
More concretely, Duchêne famously described the EU’s predecessor, the European 
Community (EC), as a “civilian group of countries long on economic power and relatively 
short on armed force”28. He saw the domestication of international relations  as one of 
the EC’s core tasks. In less abstract terms, this meant that shared values should give 
rise to a form of collective action that would “bring to international problems the sense of 
common responsibility and structures of contractual politics which have in the past been 
24 Ibid., p. 151
25 Duchêne, F. (1994), p. 388
26 Duchêne, F. (1973), as cited in Orbie, J. (2008), p. 5
27 Anon (2005)
28 Duchêne, F. (1973), p. 19
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associated almost exclusively with ‘home’ [...] affairs”29. Concerning the Union’s external 
relations, this implied an externalisation of the same type of civilian policy instruments 
that had allowed the old continent to blossom out of a post-war landscape of emotional 
rubble and material devastation. This is captured by Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker’s 
notion of Weltinnenpolitik, which collapses the distinction between domestic and foreign 
policy30, and which has been invoked by proponents of CPE31. CPE, in other words, 
called for the propagation of the European experience outside its borders. 
Hanns W. Maull’s definition of civilian power, which, unlike the concept developed by 
Duchêne, is not uniquely applied to the European Union32, has also frequently been 
invoked in the debate on both CPE and NPE33. He elaborated upon the original notion 
and adapted it to the post-Cold War geopolitical environment of the 1990s and 2000s. 
According to Maull, being a civilian power implies three things: the “necessity of 
cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives” is accepted; the focus is 
on “non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals”; and actors 
manifest a “willingness to develop supranational institutional structures to address critical 
issues of international management”34. The structural implications of the third prong are 
akin to Duchêne’s call for a domestication of world politics, in that a civilian power would 
transfer its novel decision-making structures to the international system35.    
Within Maull’s definition, there remains room for military policy instruments, but these are 
seen merely as a “residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of 
international interaction”36. Moreover, this definition does not force scholars to 
dichotomise military and civilian means. Instead, as is vividly illustrated by the 
impracticability of classifying peacekeeping forces as either military or civilian means37, it 
29 Ibid., p. 20
30 Even though the EU’s external relations technically extend beyond foreign policy, the two terms will be 
used interchangeably throughout this paper and should be seen as capturing the Union’s relations with 
governmental and non-state actors from third countries.
31 Bachmann, V. & Sidaway, J. D. (2009), p. 97
32 In fact, Maull developed his definition of a civilian power in response to intensified international alarmism 
over the growing power of Japan and Germany in a post-Cold War world order. Rather than seeing these 
World War II pundits as revanchist states, Maull envisioned them as “prototypes of a promising future” 
(1990, p. 93).  
33 See, for example, Smith (2000, 2005), Manners (2002), Bachmann & Sidaway (2009).
34 Maull, H. W. (1990), pp. 92-93.
35 Kirste, K. & Maull, H. W. (1996), p. 301.
36 Maull, H. W. (1990), pp. 92-93.
37 Smith, K. E. (2005), p. 64. Smith ends up solving this dilemma by not drawing the line between civilian and 
military means, but between civilian and non-civilian instruments instead. 
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allows them the more accurate option to place policy instruments along a military-civilian 
continuum.
Nonetheless, Maull’s definition centres heavily on civilian means, while failing to 
distinguish them from civilian ends. That is to say, as argued by Smith, it is imperative to 
acknowledge that “exercising civilian power and being a civilian power” are two 
potentially different conceptions38. Consequently, while a political actor might mainly 
make use of non-military policy instruments, this could conceivably be done according to 
a realist rationale. Simply put, it is thus not sufficient to employ civilian means in order to 
be seen as a full-fledged civilian power.
In order to infer from the writings of Duchêne and Maull how the objectives of a CPE 
differ from that of more traditional policy actors, Smith invokes Arnold Wolfers’ famous 
distinction between possession and milieu goals39. Possession goals are inextricably 
linked to national interests, and thus fit in neatly with conventional realist approaches to 
IR. Milieu goals “aim instead at shaping conditions beyond their national boundaries”40. 
While Wolfers acknowledges that milieu goals might constitute an indirect way of 
securing possession goals41, such ulterior motives should not automatically be assumed. 
As such, Smith argues that civilian powers are, at least partially, driven by milieu goals 
such as “international cooperation, solidarity, domestication of international relations [...], 
responsibility for the global environment, and the diffusion of equality, justice and 
tolerance”42. This is in tune with Duchêne’s observation that security policies had come 
to revolve more and more around “shaping the international milieu often in areas which 
at first sight have little to do with security”43. That the EU can then be seen as a civilian 
power becomes evident from the “clearly civilian” nature of the “stated objectives of EU 
external action” 44. This includes goals that would only feature indirectly on a 
conventional realist security agenda, such as the promotion of human rights and the 
support for regional co-operation.
38 Ibid., p. 64, original emphases
39 Ibid., pp. 66-67
40 Wolfers, A. (1962), p. 73
41 Ibid., p. 74
42 Smith, K. E. (2005), p. 66
43 Duchêne, F. (1972), p. 43
44 Smith, K. E. (2000), p. 16
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Combining insights from Duchêne, Maull and Smith, CPE can then be summarised as a 
European Union for which the pursuance of non-military objectives through non-military 
means is central. Within this perspective, economic policy instruments and diplomatic 
cooperation take centre stage. Furthermore, the Union must exhibit a willingness to 
sidestep unilateral or bilateral channels in favour of using “legally-binding supranational 
institutions to achieve international progress”45; there is a structural dimension to 
civilianising international relations. Principally, Civilian Power Europe implies the 
conjunction of civilian instruments with a civilian rationale; it assumes acting as, as well 
as intrinsically being a civilian actor.  
Given the aforementioned nexus between policy-making and analysis in Duchêne’s 
case, it is scarcely surprising that the concept of CPE has frequently been invoked by 
EU officials. For example, when Romano Prodi’s tenure in office as Commission 
President began, Prodi argued that “Europe needs to project its model of society into the 
wider world” and that Europe “must aim to become a global civil power at the service of 
sustainable global development”46. Prodi’s successor, José Manuel Barroso, even 
described it as his goal “to strengthen the European Union as a civilian power”47. In a 
similar vein, Olli Rehn, speaking as the Commissioner for Enlargement, described 
enlargement as the policy instrument that “reflects the essence of the EU as a civilian 
power”48. These examples are not isolated cases, but instead reflect how the Union, at 
least rhetorically, seems to perceive itself as along the lines of the notion of Civilian 
Power Europe.
Nonetheless, this close alignment between theory and practice is also a criticism that is 
often levelled at proponents of CPE, the argument being that theorists have been co-
opted by their object of study to such an extent that objective scrutiny is impeded; 
drawing the line between political rhetoric and analysis has become well-nigh 
impossible. Connectedly, policy-makers gladly embrace the idea of CPE and perpetuate 
the Union’s alleged civilian power status because its parameters are unclearly defined. 
This is what Orbie calls “the attractiveness of vagueness”49. Such ambiguity turns 
45 Manners, I. (2002), p. 237
46 Prodi, R. (2000)
47 Barroso, J. M. (2004)
48 Rehn, O. (2007)
49 Orbie, J. (2006), p. 123
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‘civilian power’ into a buzzword which allows for different interpretations, without the 
need to enter into specifics. The logical upshot of the linkage between vagueness and 
co-optation is that appraising the validity of the conclusions drawn from CPE-guided 
academic research is made more difficult. 
More importantly, from a historical perspective, critics argue that the genesis of Europe’s 
civilian character after World War II was conditional upon a strategic environment that 
had been created through the use of military power. Moreover, the EC’s emphasis on 
and prospering through trade diplomacy relied upon a security scenario within which the 
United States, or the “American protector” according to Hedley Bull50, played the role of 
a military watchdog that was permanently on guard at a time when European countries 
themselves were, for a number of reasons, unable to provide the prerequisite defence 
and security to European integration. Robert Kagan even sees a European preference 
for a decidedly non-military form of foreign policy as a manifestation of the continent’s 
weakness; acknowledging, in line with CPE, that Europe “is moving beyond power into a 
self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation”51, 
he argues that this move is made mostly out of necessity and not out of volition. 
Thus, because of a transatlantic power divide within which Europe is dwarfed by the 
hectoring military hyperpower of the US, Europe’s leaders in the second half of the 
twentieth century were forced to seek recourse to a trade-based, peaceful and 
institutionalised form of international diplomacy. While Duchêne depicted CPE as a 
largely progressive transformation of IR, Kagan’s interpretation is entirely antithetical to 
this, remarking that European countries’ “tactics, like their goal, are the tactics of the 
weak”52. Implied in his seminal article in Policy Review is the claim that if the US had not 
superseded Europe as military behemoth, Europe’s worldview, and concomitantly its 
solutions to policy problems, would reflect the Realpolitik that has historically been more 
commonly associated with it; CPE is a back-up plan to RPE. Realist critics of CPE are 
thus of the opinion that any moralistic maxims that might be suggested by the EU’s 
representation as, arguably, the most successful peace-building project in contemporary 
history will readily be discarded should Europe find itself in the military ascendancy. Any 
idealism emanating from the Union is therefore by necessity fleeting. In short, a 
50 Bull, H. (1982), p. 152
51 Kagan, R. (2002)
52 Ibid.
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European civilian power represents a second-order form of power that is constituted 
through military disempowerment. 
More recently, some scholars have argued that the label of a civilian power may at one 
point have been an accurate description of the EU’s international identity, but that it has 
since become outmoded. The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which has 
been renamed as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in the Lisbon 
Treaty, and the European Security Strategy (ESS) are often drawn upon to indicate the 
intensifying military integration of the EU. While the failure of the 1993 Treaty on 
European Union (TEU)53 to establish a European defence dimension famously led 
Christopher Hill to speak of a capability-expectations gap54, such military paralysis 
appears to have been overcome a decade later. Because these recent developments 
are seen as running counter to CPE by some55, the path to the notion has been declared 
closed off56. Statements from EU officials seem to underscore this volte-face57. 
Consequently, Bretherton and Vogler argue that the “conceptualization of the Union as a 
value-based community requires an alternative approach”58.
The ‘  Normative Power Europe’ Thesis  
Although it will become clear that the idea of NPE is partially vulnerable to the same 
criticism as CPE, it in fact sprang up out of, and as an answer to, the civilian-military 
bifurcation that was arguably taking the theorisation on the EU’s international identity in 
a stranglehold. Ian Manners, in an attempt to provide a way out of this conceptual cul-
de-sac, places an emphasis on the ideational dimension of the Union’s external role. 
According to him, proponents and critics of CPE are not polar opposites, but share a 
larger common ground than is commonly acknowledged. For example, both François 
Duchêne and Hedley Bull uphold “the centrality of the Westphalian nation-state”59 and 
thus appear to be aligned with Stanley Hoffmann and consorts in the supranationalism-
53 The TEU is also referred to as the Maastricht Treaty.
54 Hill, C. (1993)
55 There is no consensus about this, however, as authors such as Biscop & Coolsaet (2003), Larsen (2002), 
Sjursen (2006a), Stavridis (2001) and Whitman (2002) argue that the build-up of military capabilities 
transforms rather than undermines the EU’s civilian power. 
56 Smith, K. E. (2000), p. 28
57 See Prodi (2004), Rehn (2008) and Solana (2008).
58 Bretherton, C. & Vogler, J. (2006), p. 42
59 Manners, I. (2002), p. 238
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intergovernmentalism debate. Both scholars also assume a prevalence of European 
interests over universal objectives. Perhaps most fundamentally, however, they both 
valorise physical forms of power, whether manifested militarily or economically, over the 
sway that values, norms and ideas might hold. Manners saw these attributes as no 
longer fully and adequately capturing European reality, and therefore introduced the 
normative power concept in order to advance the academic debate.
The notion of NPE should thus be seen as a constructivist response to the state-centric 
logic that underlies both military and civilian conceptions of Europe’s influence in the 
world. Such an approach is akin to a Wendtian understanding of IR, in the sense that 
tangible, material structures become supplemented with, and dialectically related to, 
their intangible, intersubjective counterparts60. That is to say, the analytical gaze ought 
not to be confined to institutional actors and formal decision-making, but should be 
extended to account for the “cognitive processes, with both substantive and symbolic 
components”61 that are at the heart of the Union’s international identity. 
Manners sees the normative difference that is at the heart of the Union’s collective 
identity, which in turn enables the EU to shape what is ‘normal’ in the global realm, as 
flowing from three interconnected sources. Firstly, the Union emerged out of, as well as 
constitutes, an “explicit rejection of the divisive nationalisms, imperialism and war of 
Europe’s past”62; it can be argued that the EU is inclined to act in a normative way 
because of its historical context. Secondly, the Union’s sui generis character defies 
Westphalian conventions of statehood, while its parameters simultaneously frustrate 
attempts to typify it as a standard international organisation (IO); it is a hybrid polity that 
is unprecedented in world politics. Thirdly, arguing that the EU is a value-based 
community is not a mere declarative statement; the genesis and development of the EU 
as a collective entity that is founded in and guided by fundamental principles is reflected 
by its legal constitution. As a matter of illustration, Article 3 of the Lisbon Treaty 
stipulates that “in its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote 
its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens”63, after which 
these very values are enumerated. Comparable value statements can be found in the 
60 Cf. Zehfuss, M. (2006), p. 95 
61 Manners, I. (2002), p. 239
62 Bretherton, C. & Vogler, J. (2006), p. 42
63 European Union (2008)
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Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) and TEU64. References to 
international documents such as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in EU legislation similarly echo 
the Union’s normative difference. The norms that guide the EU’s behaviour thus are not 
simply suggested by political practice, but have been firmly anchored in, and are made 
explicit by, its constitutive treaties. In conjunction with its unique historical roots and 
unparalleled, fluid institutional framework, this legal constitution accords a normative 
dimension to the Union that definitively sets it apart from other institutional actors.
Having established how the Union’s normative difference is constructed, the question 
arises what the EU’s normative basis actually consists of. Manners identifies nine core 
norms in the EU’s acquis communautaire et politique: sustainable peace, social 
freedom, consensual democracy, associative human rights, the supranational rule of 
law, inclusive equality, social solidarity, sustainable development, and good 
governance65. While it is self-evident that these norms often overlap and impact upon 
each other, according to what Manners terms “contradictory multiplicity”66, they were 
legally enshrined at different times, reflecting the norms’ historical contingency. The 
expansion of this body of values also illustrates the politicisation of the European 
integration project, as values such as non-discrimination and good governance are not 
only intended to harness individuals against the downsides of economic integration, but 
are also meant to buttress the increasing socio-political character of the Union. The 
Charter of Fundamental Rights “restates and re-emphasizes”67 all norms, save for good 
governance, and can therefore be regarded as the culmination of the legal articulation of 
the EU’s normative difference. Moreover, while these principles might constitute a 
specifically European normative basis, they themselves transcend the EU; the specificity 
of the EU as a normative actor is in fact founded on norms that are taken to be 
“universally applicable”68.
Even though this normative basis might establish the Union as a normative actor, the EU 
needs to actively promote these principles in order to be considered a normative power. 
64 See Articles 6 and 11 (TEU) and 177 (TEC).
65 Even though Manners originally developed these nine principles in 2002, he slightly amended and 
qualified them in his 2008 article in International Affairs. This paper is written with the most up-to-date set of 
norms in mind.
66 Manners, I. (2006a), p. 179
67 Manners, I. (2002), p. 244
68 Manners, I. (2008), p. 66
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According to Manners, there are six ways through which the EU’s norms can be 
diffused69:
- Contagion, or unintentional diffusion, such as when the EU leads by example; 
- Informational diffusion as a result of “the range of strategic communications 
[...] and declaratory communications”70;
- Procedural diffusion through the institutionalisation of the EU’s relationship 
with a third party;
- Transference through the exchange of goods, trade, aid and technical 
assistance;
- Overt diffusion by virtue of the EU’s physical presence in third states or IOs;
- Cultural filter, which Manners interprets as affecting “the impact of 
international norms and political learning in third states and organizations 
leading to learning, adaptation or rejection of norms”71.
Such different pathways reflect how the Union’s normative ethics variably revolve around 
living by example, being reasonable and doing least harm72. In more philosophical 
parlance, Manners describes the normative character of the EU as underlain by a 
tripartite admixture of virtue, deontological and consequentialist ethics73. The outcome of 
the multiplicative interaction between these different forms of normative ethics with the 
available methods of norm diffusion and the constitutionalised set of principles is thus a 
potentially highly variegated normative identity; there is not but one way in which the 
Union can behave normatively in its external relations.   
However, this self-definitional form of identity politics does not reveal the complete 
picture. Role representations do not take shape in a vacuum, but are always, whether 
implicitly or explicitly, referential. Even though the Union might wish to carve out a 
certain image for itself, this identity-building is thus intersubjective; the way that the EU 
wants to portray itself might well be at odds with external interpretations and 
expectations. While the focus in this paper is on what Manners and Whitman term 
69 Manners, I. (2002), pp. 244-245
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Manners, I. (2008), p. 80
73 Ibid.
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“active identity”74, or the EU’s conscious identity project, it is thus imperative to realise 
that the construction of the EU’s international identity is continuously “created and re-
created in processes of interaction”75. 
In order to concretise the six different pathways of norm diffusion, as well as to 
substantiate his claim that the Union is a normative power, Manners looked at the EU’s 
norm advocacy in abolishing the death penalty. He argues that the EU successfully 
managed to frame capital punishment as a human rights issue that falls within the scope 
of the international community, and as such uncoupled it from the realm of the sovereign 
state. Following this reframing, the EU, according to Manners, contributed significantly to 
the abrogation of death penalty statutes in Cyprus, Poland, Albania, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan, Turkey and Russia76. He further illustrates how the method(s) of norm 
diffusion varied per case, ranging from (pre-)accession negotiations to awareness 
campaigns and from common strategies to partnership agreements, thus illustrating the 
wide set of policy tools that the Union can make use of in the pursuance of its core and 
subsidiary norms. Partly replicating Manners’ analysis, Lerch and Schwellnus concur 
with his findings, claiming that “the EU and its member states” are able to “make 
coherent human rights arguments externally without being accused of hypocrisy”77.
Nonetheless, while fundamental rights such as the right to life are considered to be 
among the Union’s founding principles, Smismans observes that this narrative is caught 
up with mythmaking: fundamental rights are retrospectively portrayed as being inherent 
to the EU and part of a collective European culture78. This also holds true for the EU’s 
normative role in the death penalty case. This norm had to be constructed craftily and 
gradually, and, as Manners acknowledges, is “rooted firmly in the human rights 
discourses of the late 1980s and early 1990s”79; it would thus be a blatant anachronism 
to assume that this norm has been present from the EC’s inception onward. Instead, the 
EU’s international policy leadership on this issue, which it has manifested multifariously 
since the late 1990s, is the outcome of an incremental process which firmly embedded 
abolition of the death penalty within the Union’s normative framework. In short, the EU 
74 Manners, I. J. & Whitman, R. G. (1998), p. 238
75 Zehfuss, M. (2006), p. 95
76 Manners, I. (2002), pp. 249-251
77 Lerch, M. & Schwellnus, G. (2006), p. 312
78 See Smismans (2010)
79 Manners, I. (2002), p. 246
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can only be “the lighthouse of fundamental rights”80 by purposely and proactively making 
the denouncement of capital punishment a visible marker of its external identity; such a 
conscious effort negates the assumption that the EU is a pure, intrinsic promoter of 
fundamental rights.
This does not, however, undermine Manners’ claim that, because of its historical roots, 
its distinctive institutional features and its catalogued body of values, the EU is 
favourably positioned, or in fact even predisposed, to stipulate what is ‘normal’ in world 
politics81. More importantly, the abolition of the death penalty is only one illustration of 
how the Union has increasingly displayed this ability to act as a normative power by 
projecting its values and by “promoting the establishment of related norms for the 
governance of international behaviour”82. Szymanski and Smith see the Union’s 
successful effort to insert a human rights suspension clause into the EU-Mexico Global 
Agreement as lending support to Manners’ thesis. They even argue that the EU “seemed 
quite willing to abandon the agreement rather than violate” its principles of democracy 
and human rights, thus substantiating the view that normative beliefs can take 
precedence over economic interests83. Other research indicates that the EU’s 
championing of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Kyoto Protocol in the 
international arena largely derives from universalist moral arguments and political 
convictions. Importantly, Scheipers and Sicurelli emphasise how the EU’s normative 
power in both cases hinges on a progressive self-representation that is constructed in 
credible opposition to American laggardness and on creating binding rules84. Groenleer 
and Van Schaik see unitary European actorness in the same cases as contingent on 
“the internationalization of values [...] and norms”85. These examples thus indicate how 
the Union has apparently been able to set international standards in several cases 
spanning different policy areas, thus lending support to the NPE-thesis. 
80 Smismans, S. (2010), p. 54
81 Manners, I. (2002), pp. 252-253
82 Bretherton, C. & Vogler, J. (2006), p. 42
83 Szymanski, M. & Smith, M. E. (2005), pp. 175, 189
84 Scheipers, S. & Sicurelli, D. (2007), pp. 451-452
85 Groenleer, M. L. P. & Van Schaik, L. G. (2007), pp. 989-990
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Empirical Criticism 
In spite of these favourable assessments of the Union’s normative track record, NPE has 
also attracted considerable criticism from an empirical vantage point. For example, 
Scheipers and Sicurelli’s original enthusiasm for NPE concerning the ICC and the Kyoto 
Protocol was tempered in their investigation of EU-Africa relations, because “material 
resources of influence” were found to be at play86. The authors consequently argue that 
an assessment of the Union’s normative power “leads to mixed results”87. Zimmermann’s 
observed pervasiveness of “geostrategic and mercantilist interests” in the EU’s trade 
negotiations about the accession of China and Russia to the World Trade Organization 
is clearly dismissive of the normative power argument88. Similarly, concerning the 
Russo-Chechen conflict, “the EU’s ‘softly-softly’ policy” was found wanting as human 
rights concerns were subjugated to conventional interests89. A double standard has also 
been observed in the EU’s external policies regarding minority protection90, as has a 
chasm between rhetoric and policy action concerning the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP)91. In analysing the EU’s policies towards the Western Balkans92, Noutcheva 
notes how the absence of a strong normative justification grounded in a universalist 
discourse inspires third actors to engage in “the politics of compliance” in which the 
Union’s normativity is exposed as a mere legitimacy-starved veneer that is laid upon 
predominantly rational interests93. Orbie et al. understand the EU’s international 
promotion of labour standards and its social model as primarily driven by “market-
making objectives” that overshadow its “social aims”94. Falkner’s interpretation of the 
Union’s leadership role in international biotechnology regulation as “a peculiar balancing 
act amidst competing principles and domestic interests” rather than a “normative stance” 
echoes this line of reasoning and highlights the Union’s embeddedness in both a 
domestic and a broader political economy95. Finally, focusing on the EU’s alleged 
international environmental leadership, Lenschow and Sprungk reveal this is a mere 
86 Scheipers, S. & Sicurelli, D. (2008), p. 620
87 Ibid., p. 619.
88 Zimmermann, H. (2007), p. 828
89 Forsberg, T. & Herd, G. P. (2005), p. 473
90 Lerch, M. & Schwellnuss, G. (2006), p. 314
91 Jones, A. & Clark, J. (2008), p. 562
92 More specifically, Noutcheva (2009) addresses the cases of Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Serbia-Kosovo.
93 Noutcheva, G. (2009), p. 1066
94 Orbie, J., Tortell, L., Kissack, R. et al. (2009), p. 102
95 Falkner, R. (2007), p. 520
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mythicised brand attribute that is not organically rooted in common values, but was in 
fact intentionally constructed in order to overcome an internal legitimacy gap96. In sum, 
while the Union is often (self-)represented as an idée force, the extent to which this is 
borne out by reality is questionable.
A different angle in this debate is provided by Bicchi, who seeks to break away from a 
norm- and interest-based dualism. While most case studies point out the prevalence of 
economic or security concerns over values, she, when analysing the promotion of 
regionalism in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, interprets the EU’s norm-setting as 
an almost institutionally automated attempt to replicate the European experience outside 
the Union’s borders, thus invalidating the claim that European foreign policy is primarily 
driven by intrinsic values97.
Furthermore, the EU’s institutional set-up provides ample opportunity for both 
institutional overlap and competition. Due to its structure as a multi-actor constellation, in 
which political authority has, often confusingly, been dispersed over various actors, a 
discordant cacophony is more likely to be heard than harmonious agreement. 
Additionally, actors might want to monopolise certain issues, thus creating tensions 
between and within the Union’s institutions98. Lightfoot and Burchell’s analysis of the 
Union’s efforts to advance the sustainable development norm at the 2002 World Summit 
on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg evidences how a lack of organisational 
cohesion negates the belief that the EU can speak credibly with one voice in its external 
relations. In particular, they observe how the ambiguity of shared competences in 
environmental policy has resulted in a half-hearted norm diffusion, as the Union acted 
unitarily on some environmental issues, while facing structural difficulties “in ensuring the 
norm is supported by all” on other subtopics99.     
A final set of empirically-based critical remarks takes issue with NPE’s Eurocentrism. By 
centring the analysis on the actors at whom the vectors of norm diffusion are directed, 
the agency of these actors is acknowledged. From this it becomes clear that these 
96 Lenschow, A. & Sprungk, C. (2010)
97 Bicchi, F. (2006) 
98 Cf. Pace (2007), p. 157. Even though Pace concerns herself only with conflict cases, the argument can 
also be extended to non-security issues.
99 Lightfoot, S. & Burchell, J. (2005), p. 91
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actors are not merely “awaiting transformation by the EU”100, but that norm internalisation 
“depends on how these norms resonate with domestic culture and are filtered by 
national political institutions and processes”101. Kratochvíl, for example, observes a 
“discursive incompatibility”102 between Russia and the EU, which accounts for a lack of 
Europeanisation among high-ranking Russian officials. Jones and Clark note that 
“widening contradictory positions and conflicting multi-interpretability” between Europe 
and the ENP countries undercut this policy’s normative persuasiveness103. On a different 
note, Storey, while in fact partly affirming the Union’s role as a norm-influencing and 
-setting bureaucracy on the global stage, argues that this norm dissemination might 
have detrimental consequences in third countries. In the case of Economic Partnership 
Agreement negotiations with African countries, the EU is promoting specific norms that 
“may not correspond to the developmental needs of African economies”104. In short, the 
Union’s norm advocacy is invariably mediated by its addressees.
Conceptual  Criticism  
The previous section indicated that the normative power argument lacks explanatory 
power in a vast array of instances. Nonetheless, most of these cases shied away from 
discarding Manners’ thesis altogether and this, by implication, leaves the door open for 
the use of NPE in different studies. That is, they merely pointed out the inapplicability of 
NPE to certain contexts, but did not offer the more general criticism that is needed to 
invalidate the framework in its entirety or to subject it to conceptual changes. It is this 
second, conceptual level of critique that forms the focus of this section.
Firstly, Manners’ thesis has been attacked for its woolliness, and for having been 
insufficiently problematised in academic circles. Despite having generally been positively 
received, Merlingen observes that “a lack of conceptual clarity” surrounds NPE105. He 
employs a Foucauldian post-structuralist approach in order to critically examine the 
concepts of norms and power. By unveiling the tensions that are at the heart of norm 
100 Kratochvíl, P. (2008), p. 399
101 Checkel, J. T. (1999), as cited in Kollman, K. & Waites, M. (2009), p. 9
102 Kratochvíl, P. (2008), p. 397
103 Jones, A. & Clark, J. (2008), p. 565
104 Storey, A. (2006), p. 343
105 Merlingen, M. (2007), p. 437
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diffusion, he highlights its “Janus-faced character”106: norms are simultaneously 
constructive and disruptive, political and apolitical, while power is both emancipatory and 
restraining. Merlingen as such renders visible the often undetected and more Cimmerian 
side of normative politics, ultimately arguing that any attempt “to promote the good life 
abroad [...] is not only an act of other-regarding ethical conduct, but also a claim to 
superordination”107. This ties into Zielonka’s contention that normative politics “is clearly 
an imperial politics”108. In short, a conceptually blindfolded analysis might lead one to 
overlook NPE’s inherent ambiguity; a lack of theoretical reflexivity runs the risk of 
unfoundedly deifying the Union as a benevolent actor in international affairs.  
Another unfortunate upshot of such an uncritical acceptance of the notion is that it is 
taken to be a positive truism, while, as Pace argues, the way NPE is constructed might 
in fact be disempowering the EU in the global political arena109. Based on a case study of 
the EU’s involvement in the conflict between Israel and Palestine, which has been 
grossly ineffective from a normative standpoint, she concludes that “we can speak of the 
power of the construction of NPEU [sic] as a matter of degree”110. Connectedly, 
Nicolaïdis and Howse, though treating Manners’ thesis favourably, stress the nexus 
between internal practices and external objectives. Not only is consistency pivotal, but 
“the goals that the EU sets itself externally need in turn to constitute the main 
benchmarks for internal policies”111. Put simply, the effectiveness of NPE is fully 
dependent upon the EU practising what it preaches. If the Union’s normative 
representations, or “narratives of projection”112, are imperfectly constructed, attempts to 
shape the world in EU’s own image will prove counterproductive, because the European 
rhetoric is exposed as a mere facade. 
In conjunction with this, Diez calls for greater self-reflexivity in studying the Union’s 
normative ethics. He postulates that the Union’s constructions of the self are intricately 
connected to constructions of the Other; “identities are seen always to require an other 
against which they thus construct at the same time”113. Cases such as the death penalty, 
106 Ibid., p. 440
107 Ibid., p. 443
108 Zielonka, J. (2008), p. 484
109 Pace, M. (2007), p. 1043
110 Ibid., p. 1059
111 Nicolaïdis, K. & Howse, R. (2002), p. 788
112 Ibid., p. 769
113 Diez, T. (2005), p. 627
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climate change and the ICC show that this Other frequently takes the form of the US. 
While representations of third actors take different forms, Diez argues that the EU largely 
constructs the Other against a European experience that holds universal validity and that 
thus ought to become “the standard for the world”114. Correspondingly, Bicchi argues that 
the Union’s purported normativity is merely an unreflexive, routine-based example of 
institutional isomorphism115. She puts forward the argument that the EU merely seeks to 
export its own model in a manner that is inherently amoral, yet outwardly dressed in a 
mantle of morality. The obvious implication is that the Other’s moral deficiency is 
highlighted, as judged against a seemingly objective measuring stick of universalism. 
Less clear, however, is that “the problematic issues within the EU” are neglected due to 
a lack of self-reflexivity116. The Union’s aim to present a common front in its external 
relations as such obscures internal imbalances regarding norm socialisation, compliance 
and implementation.  Illusions of homogeneity hide the EU’s multifaced character. As a 
consequence, due attention is only paid to the external and not the internal dimension of 
Europeanisation. Noting the differentiated member state strategies of pace-setting, foot-
dragging and fence-sitting, Börzel poignantly uncovers the intra-European differences of 
interpretation that are at the heart of allegedly common values and principles117. 
Equivalently, Jones and Clark see the “contradictory demands of negotiating order at the 
‘internal’ level and the ‘external level’ both operationally and normatively” as undermining 
the sway of the Union’s foreign policy118. Though depictions of the EU as a Lernaean 
Hydra might seem platitudinous, many studies of the Union’s normative power fall short 
of acknowledging this internal fragmentation and take European coherence for granted. 
The paradox that is revealed here, of a Union that outwardly projects a carefully crafted 
harmonious image while continuously dishonouring this very craftsmanship through 
internal norm violations, echoes the aforementioned allegations of window-dressing. 
   
The inconclusive construction of normative power is also addressed by both Eriksen and 
Sjursen, who want to overcome NPE’s definitional ambiguity by developing clear 
standards on the basis of which the normative power argument can properly be 
evaluated. They suggest that a normative power can best be distinguished from 
114 Ibid., p. 629
115 Bicchi, F. (2006), p. 287
116 Diez, T. (2005), p. 631
117 Börzel, T. A. (2002)
118 Jones, A. & Clark, J. (2008), p. 546
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conventional power politics through an entrenchment in a Kantian “higher ranking” or 
cosmopolitan law119. Such a legal anchoring of universal individual rights, as opposed to 
the emphasis on state sovereignty that is more common in standard international law, 
would “alleviate suspicions of hypocrisy and ensure consistency in the application and 
pursuit of norms”120. Concomitantly, and notwithstanding the herculean challenge of 
institutionalising the “threat of force” that is needed to make cosmopolitics effective121, 
such an approach would endow the EU’s foreign policy with greater legitimacy.   
A substantial part of the faultfinding focuses on the alleged primacy of the Union’s 
normative principles. Adrian Hyde-Price is foremost among the commentators that 
question the sincerity of the EU’s supposed farsighted self-interest or even political 
altruism. Taking a neorealist position122, he acknowledges that states might also be 
moved by ethical considerations, but that these merely amount in “quixotic moral 
crusades”123 that are the outcome of a political agenda in which ethoi are permanently 
relegated to a status of auxiliary or secondary importance. As is cogently illustrated by 
Europe’s relations with Russia and Iran124, its constituent countries “will only allow the 
EU to act as the repository for shared ethical concerns as long as this does not conflict 
with their core national interests”125. In a similar neorealist vein, the EU is argued to have 
been instrumentalised by the member states, who conduct their self-serving behaviour 
under a guise of shared and selfless morality. If one assumes that the Union itself also 
possesses what Gunnar Sjöstedt termed actorness126, something that most neorealists 
would vehemently oppose, the same logic could also be applied to the EU: when its 
values are overridden by economic or security interests, the Union either remains silent 
on its rhetorical pledges, or even violates them outright. The Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) is perhaps the clearest illustration of this127. 
Richard Youngs adopts a more subtle stance, seeing overlap rather than antagonism 
between constructivist and rationalist approaches. In his analysis of the EU’s external 
119 Eriksen, E. O. (2006), p. 253
120 Sjursen, H. (2006a), p. 244
121 Eriksen, E. O. (2006), p. 266
122 For an authoritative account on neorealist analysis, see Waltz (1979) 
123 Hyde-Price, A. (2008), p. 29
124 Hyde-Price, A. (2006), p. 223 and Ibid., pp. 34-35
125 Hyde-Price, A. (2006), p. 223
126 Sjöstedt, G. (1977)
127 Cf. Vogler, J. (2005), p. 846 and Stern, N. (2002) 
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human rights policies, he claims that “norms are woven into material interests”128. For 
him this represents more of a compromise between the ideational and the rational 
dimension than an instrumental logic veiled in a Samaritan language. Diez takes this 
reasoning one step further, by advancing the claim that the distinction between norms 
and interests is highly fluid129.   
Notwithstanding their vastly different standpoints, Hyde-Price and Youngs would 
ultimately most probably agree that, while the Union’s phraseology might frequently 
suggest “a curious blindness to own interests” 130, both a failure to follow through and the 
intermixing of strategic calculation and norm diffusion leave the member states and the 
Union open to charges of arbitrariness, unprincipled self-aggrandisement and even 
hypocrisy. Because these points partly reiterate the criticism levelled at NPE by Pace, 
Nicolaïdis and Howse, and Diez, it becomes evident that issues of consistency and 
actualisation are crucial to the credibility of the EU as a normative actor. 
On top of debunking the EU’s normative principles as little more than subsidiary 
concerns, critics also question the softness of the European policy toolkit. Thus, while 
authors such as McCormick argue that the EU’s reliance on the exercise of soft power 
has turned it into a new sort of superpower131, largely constructed in contradistinction to 
an American militarist zeal, others observe that such an overemphasis on dialogue, 
partnership, co-optation and the power of attraction is out of touch with reality. In other 
words, while purportedly acting in a non-coercing and benign manner, the Union in 
reality makes use of a wide range of policy instruments which span the hard- and soft-
power spectrum. Hyde-Price points to the EU’s transformative role in projecting stability 
into post-Cold War Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) as a potent indication of this, 
noting how the EU’s civilising role is limited to the member states’ intention “to impose 
their common values and norms”132. The Union thus brandishes carrots as well as sticks 
in conducting its foreign policy. Given the hyperdependency of neighbouring economies 
upon European markets, even apparently straightforward carrots such as preferential 
market access, association and partnership agreements and the ultimate ‘golden carrot’ 
128 Youngs, R. (2004), p. 420
129 Cf. Diez, T. (2005), p. 625
130 Jørgensen, K. E. & Laatikainen, K. V. (2004), p. 15
131 McCormick, J. (2007)
132 Hyde-Price, A. (2006), pp. 226-227, emphasis added. Not unimportantly, Hyde-Price also argues that the 
feasibility of the EU’s soft power approach to the CEE-countries hinged upon the “’hard’ security guarantees” 
provided by the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (ibid.). 
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of accession are not wholly remunerative and exhibit a coercive iron lining. As Zielonka 
pointedly puts it, “one wonders how much actual freedom” third countries possess in the 
face of a gaping “discrepancy of power”133. Even though this is not irreconcilable with 
Manners’ thesis, as he explicitly stated that the EU should be considered a normative 
power not instead of but in addition to civilian and military conceptions134, the logical 
consequence of this type of criticism is that NPE’s relevance, vis-à-vis CPE and RPE, in 
analysing the Union’s international identity is downplayed considerably.
Inextricably connected to this line of reasoning are the processes of securitisation and 
militarisation, which, as was mentioned before, have significantly diluted the case for 
civilian power perspectives on Europe. Whereas the EU’s policy mix has arguably 
invariably contained both hard and soft measures, some scholars now invoke similar 
arguments in their attempts to deconstruct a normative role representation of Europe. 
They do so by referring to recent developments such as the ESDP and ESS. Hyde-
Price, for example, interprets the ESDP as “an instrument for coalitional coercive 
diplomacy”135, whose creation constitutes an immediate reduction in valence and 
importance of value-based conceptions of the EU’s international identity. Manners 
himself does not believe that the build-up of military capabilities inevitably entails the 
attenuation of NPE. Despite acknowledging that the EU has recently “taken a sharp turn 
away from the normative path of sustainable peace towards a full spectrum of 
instruments for robust intervention”136, he argues that this is merely indicative of a 
prioritisation of military over civilian objectives; if the Union were to engage in reflexive 
militarisation, implying that military means are subservient to a civilian agenda, this 
“misdirection”137 could be corrected. Nonetheless, it appears that NPE’s proponents and 
critics are in agreement that the Union’s normative influence will be enduringly undercut 
if the current militarising trend is not reversed.
Even if the polemic of the Union as a force for good is taken to be true, the universality 
of its normative principles is subject to debate. That is to say, the EU risks succumbing 
to “the fallacy of assuming that one’s own values and interests are of universal 
133 Zielonka, J. (2008), p. 476. Zielonka made this comment in relation to enlargement, but it has broader 
applicability.
134 Manners, I. (2002), p. 253
135 Hyde-Price, A. (2006), p. 231
136 Manners, I. (2006b), p. 189
137 Ibid., p. 192
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applicability”138. An additional and connected danger is that principles which were central 
to the alleged European success story are brought to bear on external actors in an a-
contextual manner. Despite its genuinely benign aims, the EU might thus unconsciously 
engage in practices of moral imperialism as it sets out to shape the world in its own 
image. As Sjursen argues, normative power indubitably entails “the EU promoting its 
own norms in a similar manner to historical empires and contemporary powers”139. 
Consequently, even a scrupulous Union is likely to arrive at policy outcomes that are 
“tragically at variance with the original good intentions”140.  
Moreover, referring to the Union’s sui generis character has become such a 
commonplace in academic literature, that a label of idiosyncrasy might now almost 
habitually be attached to its ethos as well. Nonetheless, the normative behaviour of other 
actors negates the uniqueness of a European ethics in international relations. Even 
though the EU is “often described as a ‘normative’ power in contrast to the US”, Sjursen 
argues that it is beyond question that Manners’ thesis can be applied to the US, and 
even to the former Soviet Union141. Retorting to this, Manners effectively claimed that the 
EU is exceptional precisely because of a lack of exceptionalism. That is to say, while 
Manners does not see normativity as a solely European phenomenon, the particularity of 
NPE is accounted for and contributed to by the EU’s “historical context of reflexive 
humility and attempts to build non-hierarchical relationships”142. Furthermore, the Union, 
according to Manners, does not seek to be perpetually superior. Instead, borrowing from 
Etienne Balibar, he argues that an effective normative power is in fact a power in 
decline; a “vanishing mediator” whose interventions in international politics are aimed at 
universalism rather than uniqueness143. Despite Manners’ interjection, studies on 
China144, India145, Russia146 and, again, the US147 reveal that other countries are also 
increasingly asserting their morality in the global arena. The Union undoubtedly 
manifests its ethics in a singular manner, but the importance of heeding contextuality 
applies to other budding normative players as well. Cautioning against arguments of 
138 Hyde-Price, A. (2008), p. 35
139 Sjursen, H. (2006a), p. 247
140 Hyde-Price, A. (2008), p. 44
141 Sjursen, H. (2006a), p. 240, original emphasis
142 Manners, I. (2006a), p. 174
143 Ibid., pp. 174-175
144 Womack, B. (2008)
145 Kumar, R. (2008)
146 Makarychev, A. S. (2008)
147 Diez, T. (2005) and Hamilton, D. S. (2008)
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unidirectionality in the NPE debate, Zielonka even observes a change in the vectors of 
ideational power, as “numerous global actors are increasingly able to shape Europe’s 
normative agenda”148. Barbé et al. similarly warn against conceptual blinkers and note 
that the EU is both a norm-maker and –taker149. On the basis of an analysis of patterns 
of policy convergence between the EU and its neighbours, they put forward the 
argument that a focus on European dynamics leads to a blind spot for internationally and 
bilaterally developed norms. In short, it might be more accurate to speak of a general 
trend towards normative politics than of l’Europe extraordinaire.
Lastly, the notion of NPE is open to the same criticism as CPE when it comes to the 
independence of academia from policy-making. The two have arguably become 
conflated to such an extent, that it has become unclear whether Eurocrats have 
constructed the Union as a force for good, with scholars subsequently investigating this 
claim, or whether academic debates have given rise to a discourse within which 
normative power is ascribed onto the EU, and “through which EU actors construct 
themselves as “’model reference points’ for other parties to emulate”150. Concurringly, 
Hyde-Price argues that it is difficult for proponents of NPE to “achieve any critical 
distance” from their object of study151.
In conclusion, the panoply of criticisms that has been levelled at Normative Power 
Europe, both from an empirical and a conceptual vantage point, illustrates how this field 
of study is “at constant risk of moral hyperbole”152. These critiques forewarn against an 
uncritically sympathetic use of NPE in case studies. It is thus of paramount importance 
to incorporate these points of concern in the remainder of this paper, and to conduct an 
analysis of the EU’s normative power regarding the external protection and promotion of 
sexual minority rights that pays due attention to issues of reflexivity, contextuality and 
historicism. Before such a synthesis of theory and praxis can be reached, however, it is 
necessary to trace the development of the Union’s policy action, concerning both the 
internal and external planes, in this issue area. It is to these LGBT policies that the 
attention now shifts.
148 Zielonka, J. (2008), p. 481
149 Barbé, E., Costa, O., Herranz, A. et al. (2009), p. 382
150 Pace, M. (2007), p. 1050
151 Hyde-Price, A. (2006), p. 218
152 Falkner, R. (2007), p. 522
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3. Sexual Minority Rights in the European Union 
Throughout the history of the EU the provision of sexual minority rights has been, and 
until this day remains, mostly a matter arranged at the level of the member state. In 
other words, few competences have been conferred upon the Union concerning issues 
which are of relevance to the LGBT community. When it comes to recognising same-sex 
unions or to granting of adoption rights, for example, member states remain firmly in the 
driver’s seat. Despite this institutional arrangement, the Union’s informal as well as 
formal involvement in the politics of sexual minority rights has greatly increased 
throughout the decades. This owes much to the diffuse nature of LGBT interests; 
because sexual minority rights are linked to a vast spectrum of policy areas, it would be 
a non sequitur if EU bodies, including the Council of Ministers and the European 
Council, concluded that sexual minorities should only be dealt with at the level of the 
member state. From a neofunctionalist perspective153, European integration with regard 
to LGBT-related topic should thus be seen as a spill-over effect of the Europeanisation 
of issues that, prima facie, seem to have little to no bearing on sexual minorities. 
As a case in point, while the free movement of persons constitutes one of the 
cornerstones of the common market, an awareness of its gendered and sexualised 
character was not evident from the 1957 Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community154. Following this, the need to combat discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation and gender identity in the exercise of this freedom was originally also not 
recognised. In fact, the founding treaties only mentioned discrimination on the basis of 
nationality155. From Article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty, which reads that one of the Union’s 
objectives is to “combat social exclusion and discrimination”156, the dynamism of the 
EU’s rights framework for sexual minorities becomes apparent: treaty amendments and 
additions, as well as removals, have paved the way for a greater inclusion of LGBT 
people in legal articles that do not explicitly refer to them. 
This is not to suggest that the Union, with its corpus of official statements, non-binding 
resolutions and recommendations, and legislative acts, is only of indirect relevance to 
153 See Haas (1958)
154 European Union (2007a)
155 Ibid., Article 12.
156 European Union (2008) 
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sexual minorities. On the contrary, the number of examples in which sexual orientation 
and/or gender identity are clearly stated has been on the increase in the last two to three 
decades, showing how issues affecting LGBT people have progressively become 
recognised as a genuine cause of concern for the EU. This section outlines the 
development of European-level policies that are specifically aimed at, or take into 
account the situation of, sexual minorities. While the initial focus is on policies internal to 
the common market, the chapter concludes with a résumé of the Union’s significantly 
deepening external engagement with LGBT rights.  
The 1994 Roth Report
The European Parliament (EP) is generally seen as the motor behind this trend towards 
greater recognition of sexual minorities within the EU. This is due largely to the 
groundbreaking role played by the 1994 Roth Report. Named after Claudia Roth, a 
German Member of the European Parliament (MEP) for the Greens (Bündis 90/Die 
Grünen), this report led to the adoption of resolution A3-0028/94 on equal rights for 
homosexuals and lesbians in the European Community (EC). Even though it would be 
fallacious to interpret the resolution as the first time that the Parliament openly spoke out 
against the imbalanced rights situation of LGBT people in the EU, its influence was 
unparalleled. Beger, for example, regards the Roth Report as the “most decisive step in 
this direction”157, while the European Region of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, 
Trans- and Intersex Association (ILGA-Europe) sees it as a “cornerstone in the 
Parliament’s work for LGB rights”158. It has thus been described by both academics and 
activists as a firm mission statement that contributed greatly to the incorporation of 
sexual minority rights into human rights considerations in and of the Union
The significance of the report largely derives from its wide-ranging character. Starting 
from the premise that gay men and women have become more publicly visible, together 
with the “pluralization of lifestyles”, the equal rights resolution calls for social change and 
corresponding legal measures in order to ensure the equal treatment of citizens, 
“irrespective of their sexual orientation”159. To this end, the EP enumerated a vast array 
of initiatives at both the European and the member state level. Concerning its general 
157 Beger, N. J. (2004), p. 23
158 ILGA-Europe (2010b)
159 European Communities (1994)
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considerations, the resolution calls for, among other things, the institutional reform of the 
Union’s human rights framework by erecting a new institution that would ensure and 
monitor equal treatment160. At the national level, the Parliament’s smorgasbord included 
putting an end to the criminalisation of, as well as discrimination against, sexual activity 
between people of the same sex; equalising the age of consent for homo- and 
heterosexual activities alike; implementing measures to put a halt to an observed 
quantitative increase in violence against homosexuals; starting campaigns seeking to 
counter homophobia; and ensuring that lesbian and gay social and cultural non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) are not financially and administratively 
discriminated against by governmental bodies. The EP further urged the Commission to 
draft an equal rights recommendation which should aim at ending discriminatory 
practices in a number of fields. Such practices include unequal age of consent, 
unauthorised data storage, labour law, same-sex marriages and adoption rights. 
In summary, the Roth Report constituted an unprecedentedly progressive document in 
the history of LGBT rights in the EU. This holds true both because of the wide range of 
topics that are covered by the resolution, and for the fact that the EP’s recommendations 
went beyond the status quo of the human rights situation of homosexuals in the vast 
majority of member states. In this light, the Parliament’s outspoken position on providing 
lesbians and gay men full and equal rights concerning marriage should be considered 
particularly path-breaking, seeing as the only member states in which some form of 
common-law marriage or registered partnership was in place at the time of the 
resolution’s adoption, were the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden161. The parliamentary 
resolution is even more revolutionary from a family law perspective, given the paucity of 
gay adoption rights in Europe in 1994. Even though Ashman observes that “the absence 
of political will in the other organs of the EC has led these to ignore the views of 
Parliament”162, meaning that the report’s direct legal implications were by and large 
negligible, the Roth Report can be interpreted as a firm avowal of support of LGBT 
people in their struggle for sexual minority rights.
160 Even though the European Monitoring Centre for Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) was established in 
1997, the EUMC’s sphere of competence was limited to racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism. It was not 
until 2007, when the EUMC was transformed into the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 
(FRA) that its scope was expanded to include sexual orientation.  
161 ILGA-Europe (2010c)
162 Ashman, P. (1993), p. 4
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Developments prior to 1994
Even though parliamentary LGBT-related positions taken prior to the Roth Report were 
not nearly as influential, they are still worth taking note of, in order to illustrate how the 
equal rights resolution was by no means an eccentricity in the Parliament’s stance 
towards sexual minority rights. On the contrary, it fit in with the Parliament’s increasing 
commitment to the active promotion of these very rights. 
The first real instance that the EP displayed such a budding commitment regarding 
sexual minority rights was through a report on sexual discrimination at the workplace in 
1984. More commonly referred to as the Squarcialupi Report, after the Italian rapporteur 
Vera Squarcialupi (Partito Comunista Italiano), this report spoke out strongly against 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation at a time when the World Health 
Organization (WHO) still classified homosexuality as a mental illness163. More 
specifically, through adopting the resolution based on the Squarcialupi Report, the EP 
indicated that it “deplores all forms of discrimination based on an individual’s sexual 
tendencies” and that it considered it “impossible to ignore or passively to accept de facto 
or de jure discrimination against homosexuals”164. The report therefore urged member 
states to undertake a series of steps, including the abolition of any laws that make 
homosexual acts between consenting adults illegal165; the equalisation of the age of 
consent for homo- and heterosexual acts; and the declassification of homosexuality as a 
mental illness. The parliamentary resolution largely confined the role of the Commission 
to ensuring the combating of and reporting on discrimination with regard to employment 
and housing, but also encouraged it to take the lead in inducing the WHO to revise its 
position on homosexuality. In spite of the unequivocal character of the Parliament’s 
message, the role of the Squarcialupi Report, much like that of the Roth Report a 
decade later, was mostly advisory.
Another noteworthy example of parliamentary activism predating the Roth Report 
concerns a 1989 resolution on discrimination against transsexuals. Following from an 
understanding of the difficulties that transsexuals undergoing a sex change face in the 
163 Homosexuality was only removed from the WHO’s International Statistical Classification of Diseases and 
Related Health Problems in 1990. 
164 European Parliament (1984)
165 This clause was implicitly directed at Ireland, which was the only member state in which homosexuality 
between consenting adults in private was punishable. 
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workplace, this resolution centres simultaneously on the employment sector and on the 
medical branch. Among other things, the Parliament called upon member states to grant 
transsexuals the right to change sex, as well as to have the costs thereof reimbursed by 
health care institutions, and to secure equal treatment in the workplace166. Other 
illustrations of the importance that Parliament attaches to the human rights situation of 
sexual minorities are the specific condemning of harassment of lesbians and gay men in 
a 1991 report on a code of practice to combat sexual harassment in the workplace167, 
and the denunciation of the discrimination of children on the basis of sexual orientation 
in its 1992 resolution on a European Charter of Rights of the Child168. These examples, 
once more, evidence the EP’s focus on the intersection of human rights and non-
discrimination in its approach to sexual minorities.
Concerning the European Commission, the first real involvement in LGBT matters, apart 
from the occasional funding of LGBT organisation and activities, came in 1991 after 
pressure from ILGA169. The Commission consequently commissioned an in-depth study 
into the impact of the single market on gay men and women. The resultant report, 
‘Homosexuality: A Community Issue’, concluded with a call for action, arguing that the 
EC “cannot go on shunning responsibility, looking away, keeping mum”170. The time had 
come for both the Council and the Commission to face its responsibility, and to cease 
shifting the burden “to the Council of Europe, to the Member States, to private 
organizations”171. Despite the unambiguous wording of the report’s recommendations, 
however, the authors failed to induce the Commission to make any substantive policy 
changes or implementations.
   
Post-Roth Report developments
Without trying to downplay the significance of these manifestations of institutional 
support for sexual minority rights at the European level before 1994, the comprehensive 
Roth Report signified a real watershed moment in the Europeanisation of LGBT issues. 
166 European Parliament (1989), as cited in Council of Europe (2000), pp. 82-83 
167 Van der Veen, E., Hendriks, A. & Mattijssen, A. (1993), pp. 501-502
168 European Parliament (1992)
169 Ashman, P. (1993), p. 4. The ILGA was then still known as the International Lesbian and Gay 
Association.
170 Clapham, A. & Weiler, J. H. H. (1993), p. 397
171 Ibid.
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Illustratively, as Beger notes, Parliament “has since then included the issue of sexual 
orientation in all its annual human rights reports about the situation in the Union as well 
as in the rest of Europe”172. It has also made discrimination against homosexuals a point 
of concern in membership negotiations with candidate countries. The report thus played 
a crucial role in ensuring that issues of sexual minority rights are addressed at the 
European level. Ever since, the number of references to LGBT people in EU documents 
and discourse has spiralled upwards. Exemplifying this, the European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights (FRA) observed a marked increase in the number of parliamentary 
resolutions related to homophobia, “reflecting the increasing importance attached to this 
issue”173. In short, the Roth Report has been instrumental in firmly placing sexual 
minority rights onto the agenda of the Union.
Together with social change in the member states, these policy developments prepared 
the way for what Beger considers to be “the most significant manifestation of the 
commitment to anti-discrimination on the part of the European Union before the new 
Constitution”174, namely the expansion of the Union’s scope regarding social affairs 
through Article 13 of the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam175. While a cursory glance at the 
treaty suggests that sexual orientation is merely one among, or even the last of, many 
grounds of discrimination that ought to be combated, the empowering effect of the treaty 
becomes clear from a closer reading:
“Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and within the limits of the 
powers conferred by it upon the Community, the Council, acting unanimously on a 
proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may 
take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic 
origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation”176.
In other words, Article 13 should be seen as the first authorisation of Community action 
against discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation beyond the occupational 
realm. Though the Treaty fell short of meeting its full potential, for its failure to in fact 
172 Beger, N. J. (2004), p. 23 
173 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2009a), p. 10 
174 Beger, N. J. (2004), p. 23
175 The complete title is the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties 
establishing the European Communities and certain related acts.
176 European Union (1997)
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“prohibit these forms of discrimination prevents it from producing direct effect”177, Article 
13 already prompted the Commission into action the year after the Treaty of Amsterdam 
came into effect.
More specifically, the article formed the legal basis for the 2000 Directive establishing a 
general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation. This Employment 
Directive obliged all member states to take legal measures in order to ban discrimination 
in employment on the basis of, among other grounds, sexual orientation. People that 
perceive they have been discriminated against should also be given access to adequate 
means of legal protection. The rationale behind the directive is that discrimination on a 
stated number of grounds is at odds with the Union’s objectives. In this light a particular 
mention is made of “the attainment of a high level of employment and social protection, 
raising the standard of living and the quality of life, economic and social cohesion and 
solidarity, and the free movement of persons”178. Contemporaneously, the Commission 
launched a five-year Community Action Programme to Combat Discrimination, which 
awarded funding to a number of LGBT organisations179.
Despite the apparent progressive nature of the Employment Directive, it was greeted 
with disillusionment by the EP, ILGA-Europe and by the Social Platform, an overarching 
alliance of European social NGOs. They decried the directive’s vertical character, 
meaning that it only addressed discrimination in the employment realm. The 
Commission’s decision to split Article 13 into different directives reflected the decision-
making structure in the Council, where the requirement for unanimity was highly likely to 
prevent a more general directive from being passed. Consequently, the Race Equality 
Directive was the only horizontal directive issued in 2000, illustrating how the 
“Commission considered racism to be the only safe ground to be covered beyond 
employment”180; it was deemed highly unlikely that such a directive regarding sexual 
orientation would be equally well-received in the Council of Ministers. This is thus 
suggestive of a hierarchisation of grounds of discrimination, in which sexual orientation 
is seemingly undervalued in comparison with race- and ethnicity-based discrimination181. 
177 Arnull, A. (1999), p. 111
178 Council of the European Union (2000)
179 This action programme spanned the years between 2001 and 2006. It was superseded by the 
Programme for Employment and Social Solidarity (PROGRESS) for the period 2007-2013. 
180 Beger, N. J. (2004), p. 24
181 Cf. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2009a) , p. 35
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The sense of disillusionment also partly derived from a clause in the directive which 
justifies “a difference of treatment” in cases where a characteristic such as sexual 
orientation “constitutes a genuine and determining occupational requirement”182. This 
would enable religious employers to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. 
Practical faultfinding has augmented this content-related criticism, as it has become 
apparent that the directive’s implementation “has been variable across the Member 
States”183. Thus, the significance of the Employment Directive notwithstanding, it was 
considered to be a limited achievement by both Parliament and LGBT activists.
In the same year that the Employment Directive took effect, the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights was signed by the Council. An awareness of the need for such a document dates 
back to 1993, when the Treaty on European Union (TEU), alternatively referred to as the 
Maastricht Treaty, entered into effect. Because the TEU introduced the concept of 
European citizenship, it became evident that the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) was no longer a sufficient vehicle for dealing with fundamental rights and non-
discrimination matters. Instead, the consensus arose in Parliament that these issues 
should be dealt with explicitly in EU law. The Union’s powers in the social domain were 
also broadened considerably under the Maastricht Treaty, because the Social Protocol 
was attached to it. Consequently, the EP demanded in 1995 “that the Council draft a 
catalogue of citizenship rights beyond the economic dimension”184. After a protracted 
process, this finally resulted in the Council’s signing of the Charter at the Nice Summit of 
2000. Concerning sexual minorities, the Charter’s main relevance is located in Article 21, 
which expressly prohibits discrimination on a number of grounds, including sexual 
orientation185. 
Despite the lobbying efforts of ILGA-Europe, no mention was made of discrimination on 
the grounds of gender identity. On top of this, the CFR has limited applicability, as it only 
affects “the actions of the EU institutions and the member states’ authorities”186. De 
Búrca also downplayed the Charter’s transformative potential, arguing that it has not 
“altered anything significant within the existing legal, political and constitutional 
182 Council of the European Union (2000)
183 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2009a), p. 13
184 Beger, N. J. (2004), p. 25
185 European Communities (2000)
186 Eriksen, E. O. (2006), p. 258
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framework”187. These limitations notwithstanding, the CFR is the first international charter 
to explicitly apply the non-discrimination principle to sexual orientation.
Even though no real pièce de resistance resembling the Roth Report, Article 13 of the 
Amsterdam Treaty or the Employment Directive was issued by any European 
institutional body between 2000 and 2009, the Union’s institutional bodies became 
increasingly attuned to the plight of sexual minorities in this period. This is evidenced by 
a series of parliamentary resolutions on rampant homophobia and homophobic violence 
within the Union’s confines188 and on potentially discriminatory legal developments in 
Lithuania189. In a 2008 report on the situation of fundamental rights in the Union between 
2004 and 2008, the EP also called for a stronger involvement of the Commission in 
ensuring that member states apply the principle of mutual recognition of same-sex 
unions, and that they grant asylum to persons fleeing from persecution on the grounds of 
sexual orientation190. 
Moreover, a 2004 green paper launched by the Commission revealed a need for greater 
public awareness of European non-discrimination legislation. To this end, 2007 was 
made into the European Year of Equal Opportunities for All, with a focus on rights, 
representation, recognition and respect: activities and events aimed at making people 
aware of their rights not to be discriminated against, at increasing the participation of 
marginalised groups, at facilitating and celebrating diversity and equality, and at 
promoting a more cohesive society. Even though the initiative’s focus on equal treatment 
and non-discrimination was intentionally broad, sexual orientation formed an integral part 
of it and several LGBT NGOs were awarded funding. Significantly, in a follow-up to the 
initiative, the Council expressed its commitment to build on and to strengthen the efforts 
made during the European Year of Equal Opportunities for All191.
Furthermore, a particularly significant stride regarding the rights of transgender persons 
was made in 2006 with the adoption of the Gender Recast Directive192, which seeks to 
consolidate the provisions on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment 
187 De Búrca, G. (2001), 129
188 European Parliament (2006a, 2006b and 2007) 
189 European Parliament (2009a)
190 European Parliament (2008)
191 Council of the European Union (2007) 
192 European Union (2006a)
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between men and women in employment and occupation matters. Basing themselves on 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), Council and Parliament state in 
the directive’s preamble that the principles of equal treatment also apply to people that 
have undergone gender reassignment. In other words, the directive goes beyond 
enshrining the right to equal treatment irrespective of one’s sex at birth, by also 
denouncing discrimination on the basis of acquired gender. This is the first time that “an 
explicit reference in relation to discrimination based on ‘gender reassignment’” can be 
found in EU legislation193.
In 2008, following pressure from Parliament and NGOs, the Commission paid heed to 
the criticism of the Employment Directive by putting forward a proposal for a Council 
directive that would extend the principle of equal treatment to all areas of social life 
mentioned in the Racial Equality Directive194. Even though the Spanish Presidency of the 
Council made a series of drafting suggestions on the basis of the proposal195, no new 
directive has yet been agreed upon by the member states. For the time being the 
equality hierarchy that is symbolised by the 2000 directives, and which the Commission 
proposal essentially seeks to flatten, is thus kept in place. 
A final significant development concerns the waning declaratory character of the CFR. At 
the time of signing it was contested whether the Charter would amount to anything more 
than empty rhetoric, because its legal status was “infamously” to be “determined at a 
later stage”196. On 1 December 2009, however, the Lisbon Treaty came into effect. While 
it is important to note that the United Kingdom and Poland, later joined by the Czech 
Republic197, annexed a protocol to the Lisbon Treaty that effectively constitutes an opt-
out from the Charter198, the entering into force of the treaty made the CFR legally binding 
upon the institutions of the Union and upon all other member states when implementing 
Community legislation. Consequently, Eriksen’s verdict that “the institutionalization of a 
human rights policy in the EU is weak” should be, at least partly, revised199.
193 Fabeni, S. & Agius, S. (2009), p. 3
194 European Commission (2008b)
195 Council of the European Union (2010c)
196 Hervey, T. K. (2003), p. 203
197 Council of the European Union (2009b) 
198 The protocol states that “the Charter does not extend the ability of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, or any court or tribunal of Poland or of the United Kingdom, to find that the laws, regulations or 
administrative provisions, practices or action of Poland or of the United Kingdom are inconsistent with the 
fundamental rights, freedoms and principles that it reaffirms” (European Union, 2007b). 
199 Eriksen, E. O. (2006), p. 259
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Sexual Minority Rights in the EU’s External Relations
Even though the upholding and promoting of its values and interests “in its relations with 
the wider world” has been an EU objective since the TEU200, the outlined maturation of 
the Union’s internal human rights approach to sexual minorities has only recently started 
to find itself increasingly reflected in the EU’s external relations. Without trying to claim 
causality, it can be argued that this is a logical extension of recent developments such 
as the extension of the mandate of the Council Working Group on Human Rights 
(COHOM, 2003), the erection of the FRA (2007), the now binding character of the CFR 
(2009), the explicit inclusion of fundamental rights in the name of a Commission portfolio 
(2010)201 and the on-going establishment of the European External Action Service 
(EEAS). Significantly, discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation is explicitly 
included within the scope of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 
(EIDHR)202. This financing instrument was launched in 2006 as the Commission’s 
support tool in the promotion of democracy and human rights. More generally, the 
maturing process is in line with the Europeanisation of foreign policy-making203. Such 
changes undoubtedly enhance both the Union’s savoir-faire and confidence regarding 
fundamental rights, and, thereupon, feed into its ability to address the human rights 
situation of sexual minorities in third countries.
The European Parliament, as holds true for the inward-oriented development of LGBT 
policies, is evidently the multi-actor constellation’s most vocal and committed promoter 
of sexual minority rights outside of the Union’s borders. A particularly prominent role is 
played by the European Parliament’s Intergroup on LGBT Rights (LGBT-EP), which is 
an informal platform that consists of MEPs from different member states and different 
political groups who share an interest in LGBT issues204. Members of LGBT-EP often 
cooperate when putting forward proposals and amendments, and join together to 
address officials of the Council, Commission and European Council with parliamentary 
questions on LGBT-issues. Additionally, the intergroup’s MEPs engage in the 
200 European Union (2008), p. 17
201 This novelty was established under the second cabinet of José Manuel Barroso, which saw Viviane 
Reding taking up the portfolio of Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship.
202 European Union (2006b)
203 Cf. Gross, E. (2009)
204 It is important to keep this distinction between the LGBT-EP and the EP as a whole in mind.  
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organisation of internal and public meetings, attend conferences and Pride marches, 
issue statements on LGBT affairs, and send letters regarding sexual minority rights to an 
array of authorities at the (sub)national, European as well as at the extra-European and 
international level. This informal institutional arrangement also facilitates contact with 
civil society, although the close working relationship between intergroups and lobbying 
interest groups has been a laden point of discussion205. 
Even though Parliament’s limited competences in foreign policy matters largely explain 
why LGBT-EP’s work is guided by priorities that have a clear inward focus206, the EP, 
and the intergroup in particular, has also been highly visible regarding external LGBT 
affairs. For example, LGBT-EP MEPs have pronounced their indignation over the 
harassment of sexual minorities in a number of countries, ranging from Malawi207 to 
Turkey208, as well as over the violation of the freedom of assembly in cases such as 
Belarus209, Moldova and Ukraine210. These are merely a few recent examples of the 
intergroup’s history of monitoring human rights abuses against LGBT people outside of 
the EU’s borders. While these statements carry no legal implications, which could lead to 
talking-shop allegations, the respective parliamentarians do customarily call upon the 
Union to act in accordance with its values in its diplomatic ties with third countries.
On other occasions, the EP takes a more pronounced stance against LGBT-related 
human rights violations. A case in point is the parliamentary outrage over anti-
homosexual draft legislation by a Member of Parliament in Uganda in 2009. This bill 
purported to “protect the [...] legal, religious, and traditional family values of the people of 
Uganda against the attempts of sexual rights activists seeking to impose their values of 
sexual promiscuity on the people of Uganda”211 by introducing measures such as 
imprisonment for life and capital punishment for engaging in specific forms of 
homosexual activity. The draft legislation also proposed penal action against people who 
promote or recognise same-sex behaviour212. The European Commissioner for 
Development, Karel De Gucht, spoke out against the bill and reminded the Ugandan 
205 Cf. Tanasescu, I. (2009), pp. 50-51
206 The European Parliament’s Intergroup on LGBT Rights (2010a)
207 The European Parliament’s Intergroup on LGBT Rights (2010b)
208 The European Parliament’s Intergroup on LGBT Rights (2010c)
209 The European Parliament’s Intergroup on LGBT Rights (2010d)
210 The European Parliament’s Intergroup on LGBT Rights, ILGA-Europe & Amnesty International (2010)
211 Bahati (2009)
212 Ibid.
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government of its obligations under the Cotonou Agreement. The draft constitutes a 
violation of this agreement between the EU and a large group of countries from Africa, 
the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP), which represents a commitment of both the EU- 
and the ACP-countries to “promote and protect all fundamental freedoms and human 
rights”213. Other than this verbal reprimand, however, the Commission remained silent, 
while the Council did not put forward any joint statement whatsoever214. 
The reaction in Parliament, however, was considerably more fervid. A large number of 
MEPs, spanning six political groups, thought the issue so contentious that they put 
forward a joint motion for resolution that was adopted rather straightforwardly215. The 
resolution reflects a strong adherence to international and, in particular, cosmopolitan 
law. It emphasises that sexual orientation falls “within the remit of the individual right to 
privacy as guaranteed by international human rights law” 216. Parliament further reminds 
the Ugandan government of its human rights obligations under international law, and 
explicitly refers to the Cotonou Agreement, as well as to statements made by the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the United Nations (UN) Human Rights 
Committee. Significantly, the resolution also transcends the specificity of the Ugandan 
case by calling:
“on the Council, Commission and member states to analyse the situation in third 
countries in relation to executions, criminalisation or discrimination on grounds of 
sexual orientation and to take concerted international action to promote respect for 
human rights in those countries through appropriate means”217
As such, the resolution reaffirms the profundity of Parliament’s commitment to the 
universality of LGBT rights in a dual way: through references to cosmopolitan law, and 
by making clear that it feels itself morally obliged and de facto politically authorised, in 
spite of its limited competence, to address human rights violations against sexual 
minorities irrespective of where they are taking place. 
213 European Commission (2006a)
214 It has to be noted that several member states did express their concern unilaterally, with Sweden even 
pledging to revoke its development aid to Uganda if the bill were to pass.
215 European Parliament (2009b)
216 European Parliament (2009c)
217 Ibid.
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This dualism is similarly evident whenever MEPs table parliamentary questions directed 
at EU officials. For example, when addressing the homophobic violence and 
concomitant incompetent police intervention that plagued a regional conference of ILGA 
in Indonesia in March 2010, five MEPs reminded the Commission of the “universality 
and indivisibility of human rights”, as well as of how the incident was in contravention of 
the recently-signed Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and 
Indonesia218. The reply of the High Representative (HR), with references to an upcoming 
EU-Indonesia Human Rights Dialogue, the EIDHR and the EEAS, likewise indicated how 
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation has become firmly established as a 
key point in the Union’s external relations219.
LGBT concerns have featured particularly prominently in the EU’s relations with 
neighbouring countries, whether through enlargement, via the ENP or bilaterally. 
Regarding membership, Parliament adopted a resolution in 1998 which states that it “will 
not give its consent to the accession of any country that, through its legislation or 
policies, violates the human rights of lesbians and gay men”220. Because parliamentary 
assent is a requirement for accession, this resolution effectively professes to veto EU 
membership of countries whose governments exhibit homophobia, whether de jure or de 
facto. Whereas respect for and the protection of human rights and minorities have been 
part of the Union’s Copenhagen accession criteria since 1993221, thus suggesting that 
the resolution is superfluous, the initiative constitutes an unequivocal proclamation that 
the EP will remain especially attuned to the rights of sexual minorities in the candidate 
countries. In other words, Parliament will not allow their plight to be muffled by other 
membership criteria. This commitment is put into practice by ensuring that LGBT rights 
are mentioned in the Commission’s progress reports. As a matter of illustration, 
Parliament condemned the homophobic violence that surrounded the Gay Pride parade 
in Zagreb in the 2009 report on Croatia222; and expressed its concern about the omission 
of discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in proposed anti-
discrimination in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia223. It would be wrong to 
assume that the EP only animadverts on the rights situation of LGBT people; a 2002 
218 Cashman, M., Lunacek, U., Romeva i Rueda, R. et al. (2010) 
219 European Commission (2010b)
220 European Parliament (1998)
221 European Council (1993)
222 European Parliament (2010a)
223 European Parliament (2010b)
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resolution, which welcomed the amendment of certain discriminatory provisions of the 
Romanian penal code224, illustrates that it also underlines policy advancements that bring 
candidate countries closer to accession. In short, through the adoption of such 
resolutions, Parliament thus ensures that sexual minority rights remain on the radar in 
the enlargement process.
Concerning its approach to non-candidate neighbouring countries, the EU’s policy is 
very similar in the importance that it attaches to human rights. Within the ENP, the 
Commission’s action plans generally make the strengthening of respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms a priority area and stress the international commitments that 
these partner countries are bound by. In monitoring the progress made by the ENP-
countries, including in the field of human rights, the Commission makes use of 
contributions from civil society. Although Parliament’s legal involvement in the EU’s 
relations with neighbouring countries is essentially arm’s-length, especially in 
comparison with enlargement, its approach regarding sexual minority rights is very 
similar. That is, through its communications and questions, it hopes to stimulate rights 
reform and to ameliorate the situation of LGBT people more generally. Because the 
Commission seeks to involve civil society organisations directly under the 
neighbourhood policy, MEPs, in particular those that are part of LGBT-EP, work closely 
together with ILGA-Europe. Via parliamentary questions they, for example, try to make 
sure that the NGO’s contributions find their way into the progress reports that are 
compiled for each country separately225. The same holds true for the parliamentary input 
on EU-Russian relations, with concerns centring mostly on the breach of the freedom of 
assembly226. Outrage over the Russian authorities’ policies regarding Gay Pride 
manifestations even filtered into a parliamentary resolution227. 
In short, while the Commission’s engagement with third actors suggests a tepid concern 
for sexual minority rights through human rights provisions and references to international 
commitments, it is Parliament that proactively aims to firmly place, and keep, LGBT 
issues on the Union’s foreign policy agenda, whether on a bilateral basis, through 
membership candidacy, or via other partnership arrangements.
224 European Parliament (2002)
225 See, for example, Cashman, M., Lunacek, U., In ‘t Veld, S. et al. (2010)
226 Cashman, M., Lunacek, U., Pietikäinen, S. et al. (2010)
227 European Parliament (2006b)
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The LGBT Toolkit
The previous subsection delineated that the Union’s involvement in LGBT affairs in third 
countries, though increasing in quantity as well as vocality, has always been embedded 
in policy instruments and resolutions that have a scope that extends well beyond issues 
concerning sexual minorities. Despite Parliament’s unrelenting efforts to keep the 
interests of this frequently marginalised group on the centre stage, this inevitably puts 
LGBT rights at a risk of being diluted or overridden by other points of concern. In this 
sense, it mirrors the aforementioned hierarchised interest representation that became 
evident with the Employment Directive.
Nevertheless, the creation of a Toolkit to Promote and Protect the Enjoyment of all  
Human Rights by Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) People has the 
potential to clear the way for a heightened international actorness expressly fine-tuned 
with a view to the universality of LGBT rights. It was developed and subsequently 
adopted by the Council Working Group on Human Rights in June 2010. COHOM is 
composed of experts from the member states and has been tasked with shaping the 
EU’s human rights policy in its external relations since 1987. Its mandate was reinforced 
in 1999 and 2003, and it is the second extension that brought social policies, and by 
implication LGBT rights, under its purview228.  
The LGBT Toolkit represents the first occasion on which COHOM specifically 
acknowledges that LGBT people constitute a “vulnerable group” that merit a special 
focus within the EU’s human rights policy229. Its broadly formulated objective is to: 
“provide staff in the EU Headquarters, EU Member States’ capitals, EU Delegations, 
Representations and Embassies with an operational set of tools to be used in 
contacts with third countries, as well as with international and civil society, in order to 
promote and protect the human rights enjoyed by LGBT people within its external 
action”230.
228 Council of the European Union (2003)
229 Council of the European Union (2010d)
230 Ibid.
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Furthermore, the instrument is both conflict- and structure-oriented: it should empower 
EU actors to simultaneously respond to cases in which human rights violations have 
already occurred, and to address the root causes of such violations in order to prevent 
rights infringement from taking place altogether.
In terms of content, the toolkit lays out three priority areas. Firstly, the criminalisation of 
consenting same-sex relations is found to be incompatible with international human 
rights law. Here the EU should focus in particular on those countries where “the death 
penalty, torture or ill-treatment” is practised231. Secondly, the principles of equality and 
non-discrimination should be promoted in accordance with international agreements and 
by providing initiatives geared towards these objectives with financial or political support 
where appropriate. Thirdly, the EU should work towards supporting and protecting 
human rights defenders in LGBT-related contexts. From these priorities it could be 
inferred that the Union is careful to avoid accusations of political two-facedness by 
focusing on critical issues that have already reached a certain level of institutionalisation 
and legal entrenchment within the Union: homosexuality has been decriminalised 
throughout the EU, equality and non-discrimination have become constitutionalised 
values, and civil society organisations such as ILGA-Europe receive financial support 
from the Commission. 
  
In order to substantiate the initiative’s objectives, COHOM’s communication on the 
toolkit is replete with references to existing international documents and agreements 
within which the principle that “LGBT people have the same human rights as all 
individuals” is said to be embodied232. In particular, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) are referred to. Even though neither document makes an 
express mention of sexual orientation or gender identity, COHOM’s note on the toolkit 
seems to suggest that it understands the words “or other status” of Article 26 of the 
ICCPR233 and Article 2 of the ICESCR234 to apply to sexual minorities235.
231 Ibid.
232 Ibid.
233 United Nations General Assembly (1966a)
234 United Nations General Assembly (1966b)
235 Council of the European Union (2010d)
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By the same token, the toolkit reflects the Union’s support of a statement on the nexus 
between human rights and sexual orientation and gender identity adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in December 2008. The statement reaffirms that the 
principle of non-discrimination “requires that human rights apply equally to every human 
being regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity”236. By backing the statement, 
68 countries, including all EU member states, strongly condemned human rights 
violations on these grounds. Furthermore, the statement is a plea for the universal 
decriminalisation of homosexuality and non-conforming gender identities. A final call 
made by the letter to the President of the UNGA is to “ensure adequate protection of 
human rights defenders”237. In summary, all three of the LGBT toolkit’s priority areas of 
action are mentioned in the statement. This lends support to Sheill’s argument that it is 
important that the letter was submitted “as an official UN document”238, because it 
illustrates how cosmopolitan principles filter into actual policy measures. Analogously, 
the toolkit attempts to add weight to its priority area concerning human rights defenders 
by citing a declaration239 adopted by the UNGA in 1998 that places a particular emphasis 
on the freedom of association240, which is of the essence in the support and protection of 
LGBT rights.  
As both the ICCPR and ICESCR were adopted in 1966 by the UNGA241, and given the 
2008 statement’s status as an official document of the UN, these should all be taken as 
instances of “higher ranking” or cosmopolitan law that reflect supposedly universal 
principles242. Additional authority is derived from the symbolic fact that the covenants, 
together with the UDHR, form the International Bill of Human Rights. Furthermore, in 
writing up the policy toolkit, the Council working group also sees potential relevance in 
five other international legal instruments, as well as in a number of regional documents, 
in the protection promotion and protection of human rights enjoyed by LGBT people243. 
The policy instrument is thus portrayed as a logical outgrowth of international human 
rights law rather than as an anomalous case of European Messianism.   
236 United Nations General Assembly (2008)
237 Ibid.
238 Sheill, K. (2009b), p. 318
239 The International Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of 
Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognised Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
240 United Nations General Assembly (1999)
241 However, both treaties only entered into force in 1976.
242 Eriksen, E. O. (2006), p. 253
243 Council of the European Union (2010d)
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The toolkit also stresses that the EU itself is bound by the very principles it seeks to 
promote. This is evident not only from the fact that all of its member states ratified the 
aforementioned covenants, but is made even more manifest via references to the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)244 and the CFR. Additionally, the 
instrument specifies that action should be guided by the EU Guidelines on Human 
Rights and International Humanitarian Law, which are “practical tools to help EU 
representations in the field” to improve the advancement of EU policy245. Of particular 
relevance in the case of LGBT rights are the guidelines on the death penalty; on torture 
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; on human rights 
defenders; and on violence against women and girls and combating all forms of 
discrimination against them246.   
The toolkit’s cosmopolitan accent also becomes evident from the operational tools that 
are at the disposal of EU actors in their attempts to accomplish the aforementioned 
aims. While varying greatly in character, including fact sheets, reports, démarches, 
information exchange, close cooperation with civil society and even prison visits and 
court attendance, the weight that is attached to the EU’s representations at multilateral 
platforms is particularly significant. The instrument stipulates that EU actors should 
promote the support of and compliance with the UDHR and the aforementioned 
statement made at the UNGA in 2008. LGBT concerns should further be incorporated 
into “statements and in questions during interactive dialogues at the UN”247 as well as 
into the quadrennial review of the human rights situation of the UN member states248. 
Moreover, concerning political dialogue, an emphasis is placed on encouraging third 
countries to sign and/or ratify the ICCPR and the ICESCR and “to invite UN Human 
Rights Special Procedures to conduct country and thematic missions”249. References to 
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe 
further indicate how significant COHOM perceives multilateralism to be in supporting and 
protecting sexual minority rights.
244 The Lisbon Treaty renamed the Treaty of Rome as the TFEU.
245 Council of the European Union (2009a), p. 3
246 Council of the European Union (2010d)
247 Ibid.
248 This is the so-called Universal Periodic Review of the UN’s Human Rights Council in Geneva. 
249 Ibid.
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The abundance of references to international human rights law, and to cosmopolitan law 
in particular, seem to imply that the fundamental rights of individuals are of paramount 
importance to the Union. This is suggestive of a shift away from the “exclusive emphasis 
on the rights of sovereign states within a multilateral order” to a cosmopolitan order250. 
From this perspective, the toolkit represents the materialisation of the EU’s awareness 
that the violation of LGBT rights is in contravention of the Union’s normative roots; 
refraining from being proactively and structurally involved in LGBT issues in its external 
relations would thus be at variance with the universal values upon which the Union is 
founded.
In conclusion, this section has made clear that the Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
the LGBT toolkit constitute the zeniths, respectively from an internal and external focal 
point, in the Union’s promotion and protection of the human rights of LGBT people. It has 
further become evident that meaningful intra-European policy developments, having 
their roots in groundbreaking parliamentary reports and culminating in the first binding 
international document that expressly prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation, progressively find themselves reflected in the EU’s engagements with third 
countries. The incorporation of sexual minority rights into the Union’s external relations is 
a relatively new phenomenon, which could potentially flourish into a powerful trademark 
of a European human rights policy by the adoption of the LGBT toolkit. With a view to 
properly evaluating this potential, however, it is important to analyse the outlined policy 
developments more critically, both from a de jure and a de facto perspective, in order to 
lay bare any conflictions and incoherence that might prevent the Union from acting as a 
full-fledged, credible and effective normative power in the case of sexual minority rights.
250 Sjursen, H. (2006a), p. 246
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4. Conflicted Normative Power and Sexual Minority Rights
In conceptualising the Union’s international identity it has become almost prosaic to 
stress its singularity and how this defies classification of the EU as a monolithic entity. 
The formulation of the EU’s external policies instead derives from the interactivity 
between the national and EU levels, with an increasing openness to, and 
embeddedness in, regional and subnational levels, other multilateral institutions and 
non-governmental policy actors. The EU is thus an exemplar of multi-level governance. 
Rejecting the state-centric “separation between domestic and international politics”251, 
the MLG-framework instead speaks of “a range of mutually dependent actors across 
different policy levels, with multiple powers and interests, complementary functions and 
overlapping competences”252. Furthermore, the distribution of these competences across 
different actors is inevitably variable across different issue areas in as diffuse a policy 
field as external relations. In short, domestic and international politics are intricately 
entangled in a network of interrelations. 
However, there is a downside to this multilevel and multilocation nature of the EU’s 
foreign policy. The fluidity and dispersiveness of the Union’s institutional arrangements 
make coherence, congruence and consistency particularly difficult to attain. According to 
Bretherton and Vogler, “there are numerous areas where the hybrid identity of the Union 
is associated with tensions and inconsistencies between roles and associated 
practices”253. This in turn negatively impacts upon the EU’s external projection of power. 
As an illustration of this, Meunier and Nicolaïdis, focusing on the EU’s endowments on 
the global marketplace, note that the EU is indubitably a “power in trade”, but that this 
does not automatically translate into being a “power through trade”254. The conclusion of 
their deconstructive analysis of the image, as well as self-representation, of the Union as 
an economic powerhouse was rather sobering to Europhiles: the EU was a “conflicted 
trade power” that could only be made to act both effectively and legitimately through 
“strategies of reconciliation”255.
251 Hooghe, L. & Marks, G. (2001), p. 4
252 Keukeleire, S. & MacNaughtan, J. (2008), p. 32
253 Bretherton, C. & Vogler, J. (2006), p. 59
254 Meunier, S.& Nicolaïdis, K. (2006), p. 907
255 Ibid., p. 915
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Such an uncovering of the conflictions that flow from hybrid governance is especially 
critical at a time when the EU is arguably stepping up its efforts as a normative foreign 
policy actor, as the LGBT toolkit suggests it has been preparing to do with respect to 
sexual minority rights, for it opens the door to charges of organised hypocrisy256. That is 
to say, while the Union might aspire to the global propagation of long-held values such 
as equality and non-discrimination, it frequently violates these very principles due to the 
complex nature of its internal and institutional dynamics. This contradiction of outward 
saintliness and internal noncompliance might consequently hamstring the Union in its 
exercise of normative power. This section investigates this concern by placing the 
argument made by Meunier and Nicolaïdis in a normative context. Whereas their 
emphasis on trade recalls the notion of CPE, with its similar stress on economic might as 
the source of the EU’s influence in international relations, Manners’ argument that 
Duchêne’s concept, like RPE, is incapable of capturing the growing significance of non-
physical forms of power suggests the need for such a transposition. 
This is certainly true in the case of sexual minority rights, where the rhetoric of EU actors 
has revealed a strong preference for value- and rights-based, non-coercive action, both 
with respect to the internal and the external dimensions. Concerning Manners’ typology 
of normative principles, the “reinforcement and expansion” of which “allows the EU to 
present and legitimate itself as being more than the sum of its parts”257, the norm of 
associative human rights is evidently preeminent in the LGBT-related parts of its foreign 
policy. Inseparable from the human rights norm is the principle of the supranational role 
of law. Here cosmopolitanism is emphasised, as becomes clear from Article 21 of the 
Lisbon Treaty, which reads that the EU “shall promote multilateral solutions to common 
problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations”258. A third normative 
principle that has a bearing on the external protection and promotion of LGBT rights is 
inclusive equality, which is epitomised by Article 21 of the CFR. Of auxiliary importance 
are the norms of social solidarity, especially through combating social exclusion, and 
good governance, by virtue of “the participation of civil society and the strengthening of 
multilateral cooperation”259. It is the interplay of these five principles that underlies the 
EU’s norm entrepreneurship regarding sexual minority rights. 
256 Cf. Krasner, S. D. (1999)
257 Manners, I. (2002), p. 244
258 European Union (2008)
259 Manners, I. (2008), p. 74
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By replicating the approach of Meunier and Nicolaïdis in a normative setting, the 
remainder of this section will examine the extent to which this interplay is plagued by 
contradictions and fault lines that undermine the Union’s credibility and, concomitantly, 
reduce the EU to a conflicted normative power with regards to the human rights of LGBT 
people. Four sets of contradictions will be addressed: internal, institutional, instrumental 
and conceptual.
Internal Inconsistencies
For the Union to be an effective and legitimate normative power it is of the essence that 
it exercises consistency between its internal and external policies. As Nicolaïdis and 
Howse note, this requires “a constant checking of the EU’s narratives of projection on to 
its own internal goals and [...] deficits”260. Put differently, it is imperative that “leading by 
example” is made into “the leitmotif of a new European Union human rights policy”261.  If 
the Union wants to speak authoritatively on LGBT-related human rights issues in its 
international relations, it must thus not only reach a certain “value consensus of acquis 
éthique”262, but this de jure situation must also be reflected in the lived experiences of 
LGBT people in the EU itself. 
However, a closer look at the intra-European dimension reveals that it would be 
fallacious to describe the human rights situation of LGBT people in the member states 
as a level-playing field. In 2006 and 2007 the European Parliament adopted a series of 
resolutions in which it remarked upon the surge of homophobia in Europe263. Such 
intolerance took a broad number of forms, ranging from:
“banning gay pride or equality marches to the use by leading politicians and 
religious leaders of inflammatory or threatening language or hate speech, 
failure by police to provide adequate protection or even breaking up peaceful 
demonstrations, violent demonstrations by homophobic groups, and the 
260 Nicolaïdis, K. & Howse, R. (2002), p. 771
261 Alston, P. & Weiler, J. H. H. (1998), p. 663, original emphasis
262 Lerch, M. & Schwellnus, G. (2006), p. 312
263 European Parliament (2006a, 2006b and 2007)
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introduction of changes to constitutions explicitly to prohibit same-sex 
unions”264.   
Notwithstanding a series of positive legal developments at both the member state and 
EU level, Parliament saw this bleak picture as evidence for the need for further action “to 
eradicate homophobia and promote a culture of freedom, tolerance and equality among 
citizens and in legal systems”265. References were made to individual cases, such as the 
bullying-inspired suicide of an Italian teenager266, in order to vividly underscore the 
urgency of the matter.
Parliamentary resolutions reveal that homophobia is notably rampant in the eastern 
member states, in particular in Poland and Lithuania. In Poland, leading politicians 
incited hatred and violence against LGBT people and the government announced a 
number of discriminatory measures in the field of education, such as drafting legislation 
“punishing ‘homosexual propaganda’ in schools”267 and firing openly homosexual 
teachers. In 2009, the Lithuanian Parliament amended a law that prohibits the 
dissemination of public information to minors through which “homosexual, bisexual or 
polygamous relations are promoted” because of the “detrimental effect on the 
development of minors” that this information would have268. The involvement of 
governmental actors in both countries hints at an institutionalised form of homophobia.
In conjunction with the discussion on the Commission proposal for a directive that 
extends the scope of the non-discrimination principle regarding sexual orientation 
beyond the grounds that are covered in the Employment Directive, these developments 
inspired the EP to ask the Union’s fundamental rights agency “to launch a 
comprehensive report on homophobia and discrimination based on sexual orientation” in 
the member states269. This resulted in two separate legal and social reports.
The results of the exhaustive legal analysis were mixed. FRA partly lauded the many 
member states that have gone beyond the minimal legal requirements, but was 
264 European Parliament (2006a)
265 Ibid.
266 European Parliament (2007)
267 Ibid.
268 European Parliament (2009a)
269 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2009a), p. 3
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particularly critical of the legal uncertainty surrounding transgender people in the EU, 
owing to the fact that discrimination of this group is not treated as either sex- or sexual 
orientation-based discrimination in almost half of the member states. Moreover, a 
number of EU legislative instruments “do not take explicitly into account the situation of 
LGBT persons”, which could hamper “legal certainty and equal treatment”270. Such 
legislation concerns, among other issues, the freedom of movement, asylum and family 
reunification. In sum, the legal situation of LGBT people in the member states is 
described as calling “for serious considerations”271.
These legal sore spots are compounded by the “worrying” and “not satisfactory” social 
situation272. The Agency argues that “discrimination, bullying and harassment” are 
pervasive throughout the Union and across a wide range of areas of social life, including 
the freedom of assembly, the labour market, education, the health sector, religious 
institutions, sports, the media and asylum273. The report further notes that LGBT people 
are predisposed to encountering multiple discrimination because they constitute a highly 
diverse group. More generally, a Eurobarometer study cited in the report reveals that 
“openness towards homosexuality tends to be quite limited”274. A later survey showed 
that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is the most widespread form of 
discrimination in the EU, apart from ethnic origin-induced discrimination275. The analysis 
also reveals the particular vulnerability of transgendered people, who, as a minority 
within a minority, “face more negative attitudes” than lesbians, gays and bisexuals 
(LGB)276. More generally, the Agency concludes that it is “unacceptable”, in a Union that 
prides itself on being founded on values that should obviate this very behaviour, that 
many LGBT people adopt a strategy of invisibility in order to avoid being discriminated 
against and suffering unequal treatment277.  
Perhaps the most significant conclusion of the report, however, is how greatly attitudes 
towards LGBT people vary across the member states. Eurobarometer surveys, for 
example, indicate that “cultural attitudes” are an important factor “particularly with 
270 Ibid., p. 4
271 Ibid.
272 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2009b), p. 3
273 Ibid., p. 8
274 European Commission (2006b), p. 41 
275 European Commission (2008a), p. 52 
276 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2009b), p. 15
277 Ibid., p. 4
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regards to homosexuality”278. As such, an attitudinal chasm can be observed between 
relatively open-minded countries such as the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark and 
less tolerant states such as Romania, Bulgaria and Latvia279. Such differentiation is also 
evident in the de facto treatment of sexual minorities. As a case in point, while some 
countries consider homophobic intent an aggravating factor in the practice of hate 
speech or hate crimes, thirteen member states treat it as “neither a criminal offence nor 
an aggravating factor”280. The variance also becomes visible with respect to gay pride 
marches: while leading politicians in some EU member states actively take part in such 
parades, the freedom of assembly has in recent years in fact been infringed in several 
Baltic and Eastern European states. These findings, in short, unveil the EU’s motto of 
Unity in diversity as a double entendre and are suggestive of an ethical divide between 
the older, western member states and the more easterly located newcomers.
These sobering conclusions are corroborated by a policy paper of ILGA-Europe of 2004, 
which marked the year that ten new countries joined the EU281. This accession followed 
membership negotiations within which, as was addressed in the subsection on the role 
of sexual minority rights in the EU’s external relations, respect for human rights was a 
membership criterion. Nonetheless, the policy paper concluded that LGB people in the 
accession countries face widespread discrimination that “affects all spheres of life” and 
that is on occasion is marked by governmental involvement282. 
Two main conclusions can be drawn from this. Most optimistic is the assumption that the 
unsatisfactory human rights situation of LGB people could best be redressed once the 
new members were firmly bound by the Union’s acquis. O’Dwyer rejects this 
interpretation in an interview, however, by noting how “the ability of the EU to impose 
pressure [...] has drastically diminished” following accession and how the EU must now 
rely on “methods that are based on voluntarism”283. Correspondingly, Kochenov 
describes the EU’s actions in the 2004 and 2007 enlargements284 as “timid, ill-focused, 
and stopped short of realising the potential for change”285. More bleakly, ILGA-Europe 
278 European Commission (2008a), p. 5
279 European Commission (2006b), p. 41
280 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2009b), p. 37
281 Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
282 ILGA-Europe (2004), p. 42
283 Stenqvist, T. (2009), p. 7
284 Bulgaria and Romania acceded to the Union in 2007.
285 Kochenov, D. (2007), p. 460
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claims that sexual orientation “has received limited attention in the EU enlargement 
process”286, suggesting that the rights of LGBT people were firmly at the bottom of the 
hierarchical pyramid of concerns and criteria that marked the accession talks. Whichever 
conclusion is drawn, it is clear that the 2004 enlargement is more indicative of the 
Union’s moral relativism than of normative ascendancy with respect to LGBT rights.
Tangentially, the legal situation pertaining to the existence of same-sex unions, whether 
through actual marriages, registered partnerships or other arrangements, and their 
recognition in other Member States varies considerably as well. Coupled with one of the 
core principles underpinning the common market, namely the freedom of movement, this 
gives rise to “an entirely chaotic situation with marriage recognition”287. Here, again, a 
generalised difference between western and eastern member states can be observed. 
Because same-sex unions do not fall under the purview of Community law, and 
irrespective of the Roth Report’s recommendation that gay couples should be 
guaranteed “the full rights and benefits of marriage”288, this topic is only mentioned in 
passing in order to further evidence the disparities that exist across the EU when it 
comes to the rights of LGBT people.
Finally, the opting out of the CFR by the United Kingdom, Poland and the Czech 
Republic probably is most illustrative of legal incongruence at the EU-level. The opt-outs 
prevent the ECJ, as well as national courts and tribunals in the three member states, 
from finding the countries’ laws and regulations to be in violation of the fundamental 
rights and freedoms declared by the Charter. As a consequence, the non-discrimination 
principle cannot be held to be binding with respect to sexual orientation. Even though the 
British and Czech exceptions were secured for reasons that were not directly related to 
sexual orientation, the opt-outs do impact negatively upon LGBT people. The same 
cannot be said for Poland; the Polish political elite considered the CFR’s provisions on 
moral and family issues, especially with respect to the legal recognition of same-sex 
unions, to be contrary to Polish culture289. Resultantly, this display of Europe à la carte 
eats away at the Union’s credibility in its foreign policy on sexual minority rights.
286 ILGA-Europe (2004), p. 7
287 Kochenov, D. (2009), p. 182
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To conclude this subsection, it has become clear that the Union’s potential to lead by 
example on rights-related issues concerning LGBT people is severely compromised by 
the observation that de facto and de jure homophobia and discrimination on the grounds 
of sexual orientation and gender identity remain rife, or may even be on the rise, within 
the member states. Even though such intolerance is all-pervading in the EU, recent 
enlargements appear to have led to the incorporation of a moral east-west chasm with 
respect to sexual morality and ethics. Greatly informative in this respect is the reflection 
of Lerch and Schwellnus that “arguments justifying minority protection with reference to 
universal rights or particular values [...] run the risk of exposing the discrepancies 
between the internal and external application of the minority norm”290. In other words, the 
need to address the incongruous human rights situation of sexual minorities at home 
robs the Union of its ability to address LGBT rights in its foreign policy without being 
accused of double standards.
Institutional Inconsistencies
Following from the understanding that the Union is a multi-actor constellation rather than 
a monolith, and given the fact that several institutional actors have been invested with at 
least some sort of political authority over or say in sexual minority affairs, it becomes 
possible to compare the positions that different EU bodies have taken in the protection 
and promotion of LGBT human rights. Such a comparison reveals that institutional 
arrangements not only make it difficult for the Union to speak with one voice, but that 
they, at times, appear to reach little more than cacophonous disagreement.  
The overview of LGBT-related policy developments has already illustrated that even 
though its relative powerlessness might suggest a rather modest human rights role, the 
European Parliament has in fact frequently acted as a patron of human rights, and of the 
LGBT community in particular. As Bradley notes, this is especially true with respect to 
the Parliament’s active involvement in the human rights situation in third countries, which 
can almost be read as an attempt “to compensate through the quantity and scope of its 
activity for its lack of formal clout”291. The parliamentary resolution on the Ugandan Anti-
Homosexuality Bill should be recalled in this light.
290 Lerch, M. & Schwellnus, G. (2006), p. 314
291 Bradley, K. S. C. (1999), p. 840
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Minor internal divisions notwithstanding, Parliament’s positions on human rights issues, 
including those relating to LGBT people, are remarkably often consensual despite being 
made up of groups that span the entire political spectrum. Even when some issues might 
prove contentious, Beger notes how “human rights rhetoric appears on a very regular 
basis and is considered pivotal to all MEPs and parties”292. Such a view is corroborated 
by Kochenov293 as well as by the Fundamental Rights Agency, which describes 
Parliament as having been “consistently supportive of gay and lesbian rights”294. 
The record of the European Commission concerning LGBT human rights is mixed. On 
the one hand, it has been ascribed a role of “political entrepreneurship”295. This partly 
accounts for the Europeanisation of social policy, which has brought matters of sexual 
orientation and gender identity under a European purview, especially in relation to 
employment. The Commission also funds NGOs such as ILGA-Europe, first under the 
Community Action Programme to Combat Discrimination and then under PROGRESS, 
with a view to maintaining a social dialogue with civil society. As ILGA-Europe’s largest 
donor, the Commission has contributed to the professionalisation of LGBT interest 
representation. Furthermore, following the entering into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, 
Commission entrepreneurialism was at the heart of the 2000 Employment Directive. It 
has already been documented how this constituted a watershed moment in the 
development of LGBT rights in the EU. On top of this, a 2008 proposal revealed the 
Commission’s wish to “implement the principle of equal treatment [...] outside the labour 
market”296 in order to address allegations that some grounds of discrimination are treated 
as being “more equal than others”297. In this light, the Commission thus seems to be a 
driving force behind the European-level institutionalisation of LGBT rights. 
On the other hand, this apparent political avant-gardism needs to be put in perspective. 
Concerning the aforementioned directives, Swiebel notes that the Commission could 
only be persuaded to act “after strong lobbying” from NGOs and Parliament, and then 
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293 Kochenov, D. (2007), p. 479
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did so with a considerable delay298. Kochenov is even more scathing. In his review of the 
Commission’s role in the enlargement process leading up to the 2004 and 2007 
accessions, he notes how the Commission was “unwilling to acknowledge and criticise 
the candidate countries’ numerous problems” in the domain of sexual minority rights, 
eventually being forced to address them due to Parliament’s tireless advocacy299. As a 
case in point, in summarising Romania’s compliance with the political subset of the 
Copenhagen criteria, the Commission in 1997 remained entirely silent on the human 
rights situation of LGBT people300 at a time when Romania “de facto criminalised 
consensual, same-sex relations between adults, had criminal legislation establishing 
different ages of consent [...], and did not outlaw discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation”301. This calls to mind earlier criticisms of a hierarchy of concerns, even 
though the Romanian situation was redressed pre-accession in 2001, and shows how 
the Commission has been infirm of purpose when it comes to sexual minority rights.
The Union’s institutional set-up accounts for the rather passive role that the Council has 
played in the promotion and protection of LGBT rights. Because it is comprised of 
government representatives from the different member states, many of which are rather 
indifferent to or even “uncomfortable with the idea of gay rights protection”302, it has 
seldom played a leading role. On the one hand, this reflects the aforementioned 
differences in attitudes and the social status quo between member states. On the other 
hand, it should be connected to the Council’s consensus-seeking tendency, which is 
based on the doctrine “that ‘all states are equal’”303. The two intersect: because such an 
institutional culture generally results in lowest-common-denominator policies, this fits 
poorly with how contentious LGBT rights are considered to be in certain member states.
A meaningful exception to this is the role that the Spanish Presidency, in cooperation 
with other member states, had in jumpstarting the creation of the LGBT toolkit.
The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is 
emblematic of the Union’s hybridity. While the post was originally closely affiliated to the 
Council, the Lisbon Treaty amended it so that the HR is now also the Commission’s first 
298 Swiebel, J. (2009), p. 23
299 Kochenov, D. (2007), p. 479
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301 Kochenov, D. (2007), p. 474
302 Kochenov, D. (2009), p. 186
303 Sherrington, P. (2000), p. 175
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vice-president. This double-hatted post is envisioned to increase the Union’s coherence 
and visibility in its external relations, as the HR speaks on behalf of the Union as a 
whole, rather than as a representative of either the Council or the Commission. Even 
though the reformed post has only been in existence for a short period, the HR’s 
statement on human rights violations against LGBT people in Malawi304 and the IDAHO-
declaration that was cited in the introduction already promise greater involvement, 
compared to the original position, in the upholding and protecting of LGBT human rights.
Finally, the ECJ has been astoundingly conservative in its rulings on the rights of sexual 
minorities. Whereas the Court has generally been accused of engaging in judicial 
activism, persistently promoting its “own political agenda of European integration”305, 
such behaviour has been conspicuously absent regarding LGBT-issues. This is 
surprising, because court rulings could have brought this issue area, which by and large 
remains a member state competence in spite of greater European-level involvement in 
sexual minority rights, within a supranational scope306. The case of P v. S and Cornwall  
County Council, dealing with sex discrimination in employment concerning transsexuals, 
is a notable exception307. The ECJ’s general reluctance to advance LGBT rights at the 
European level has resulted in “a conjugal hierarchy” topped by heterosexual married 
couples that can freely exercise the freedom of movement, while same-sex couples find 
their rights restricted308. In the light of this paper’s political focus, this legal point need not 
be elaborated upon. It is, however, important to note that this conservatism has also had 
a decelerating effect on the development of sexual minority rights at the European level, 
because cases at the Court impact upon the policy behaviour of the Community at large. 
A demonstration of this is how the Commission’s behaviour in the case of the EU’s 
eastern enlargement was informed by the Court’s orthodoxy309. In sum, the fact that the 
ECJ has at times “simply refused to protect sexual minorities”310 leads Kochenov to 
conclude that it has a “questionable gay rights record”311.
304 Council of the European Union (2010b)
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In short, the EU’s involvement in LGBT matters has shown considerable institutional 
fragmentation and differentiation. While this might present civil society actors such as 
ILGA-Europe with the opportunity to engage in venue shopping312, and as such could 
have a marked ameliorative effect on the rights situation of LGBT people within the 
Union itself, its influence on the Union’s external sway is mostly disempowering. That is 
to say, the Union’s institutional inability to streamline its viewpoints and policy actions 
with regard to sexual minority rights strips it of its authority and credibility in the EU’s 
external relations. 
Conceptual Inconsistencies
Coherence and consistency are also found wanting in the EU’s policies towards sexual 
minorities from a conceptual level. That is to say, both the Union’s definition and 
application of the ‘LGBT’ concept evidence a lack of parallelism. Fundamentally, most 
European-level policies referring to sexual orientation and gender identity fail to define 
these concepts altogether. In the light of the academic debate surrounding these 
concepts, this lack of reflexivity is bewildering. Such debate, for example, has displayed 
a growing tendency to describe these terms as located on a spectrum rather than as 
categorical identity markers. In a similar fashion, it is increasingly acknowledged that 
these concepts are made up of several components313. These insights suggest against 
straightforward classification and thus point to the need for clear and consistent 
definitions when they are put to policy use. This is, however, disregarded by most EU 
documents, including the Amsterdam Treaty, the Employment Directive and the CFR, as 
well as parliamentary reports and resolutions. Consequently, such a lack of definitional 
clarity prepares the ground for arbitrariness and legal uncertainty.
Nonetheless, an upward trend appears to have been set into motion recently, because 
the FRA’s social analysis, the LGBT toolkit and a recent policy paper on transgender 
persons’ rights in the EU requested by Parliament314 to some extent define the different 
components of which the LGBT-concept is made up. The Agency has based itself on 
existing conceptualisations and has, where possible, aligned itself with accepted 
international principles. This is illustrated by its definitions of sexual orientation and 
312 Cf. Baumgartner, F. & Jones, B. (1993)
313 Savin-Williams, R. C. (2009), pp. 7-11
314 Castagnoli, C. (2010), p. 3
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gender identity, which have been directly taken from the Yogyakarta Principles on the 
Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity. The Yogyakarta Principles constitute an attempt on behalf of “a coalition 
of human rights organisations” to rectify the “fragmented and inconsistent” international 
response to human rights violations based on sexual orientation and gender identity315. 
Drafted by a group of human rights experts from across the globe, these principles are 
derived from existing legal instruments in order to illustrate how the violation of LGBT 
human rights is already in contravention of binding international human rights law. In 
other words, because the universal adoption of a new human rights framework would 
doubtlessly be highly controversial, the Principles engage with the legal status quo. The 
parliamentary policy paper also cites the Yogyakarta Principles. In conceptualising 
transgenderism, FRA draws from a definition used by TransGender Europe (TGEU), an 
umbrella organisation that works towards establishing full social and legal equality of 
transgender people in Europe316. Similarly reflective of the Agency’s task to engage in 
networking and stakeholder cooperation317 is its reference to the International Gay and 
Lesbian Human Rights Commission in defining gender expression318. The LGBT toolkit’s 
interpretation of sexual orientation, gender identity, homosexuality, bisexuality, and 
transgenderism and -sexualism largely corresponds to these references.   
Thus, the instances of the social analysis, the toolkit and the policy paper illustrate how 
different EU actors have started to carefully embed their communications into the 
existing civil society dialogue on LGBT rights with a view to enhancing their 
authoritativeness. Because these definitions, as the Agency acknowledges, “have not as 
yet been identified in EU or in international standard setting instruments and do not 
necessarily have legal value”319 they should not be interpreted as showcases of 
cosmopolitanism. Claiming authority from them thus runs the risk of turning into an 
argumentum ad verecundiam. It also needs to be borne in mind that all three 
communications were drafted by policy experts rather than high-level political actors. 
Nonetheless, and in spite of how the definitions could be conceptually deconstructed320, 
315 Anon (2007a), pp. 6-7
316 Cf. TransGender Europe (2006)
317 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2009c)
318 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2009b), p. 24
319 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2009b), p. 24
320 Swiebel (2009, p. 32) argues, for example, that the Yogyakarta Principles tend to “reify sexual 
preferences into solid, essentialist identities”. Also see Kollman, K. & Waites, M. (2009), p. 5. 
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drawing upon the Yogyakarta Principles and applying terminology used by NGOs 
prepares the ground for a conceptual blueprint upon which future EU involvement in 
LGBT matters could be based, so as to improve the Union’s coherence and consistency.
The scattered approach that the Union has taken to sexual orientation and gender 
identity is another grave cause for concern. Sometimes EU policies and statements box 
people of different non-mainstream sexual orientations and gender identities together, 
treating ‘LGBT’ as a unitary if not homogeneous concept, whereas such indivisibility is 
done away with on other occasions. At face value this might appear to be the case 
because LGBT people constitute a highly diverse group, and such heterogeneity 
inevitably brings about different challenges. Perhaps the most important distinction that 
has to be made here is between sexual orientation, defined by the Yogyakarta Principles 
as a person’s “capacity for profound emotional, affection and sexual attraction to, and 
intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender or the same gender 
or more than one gender”, and gender identity, which can be summarised as a person’s 
“deeply felt internal and individual experience of gender, which may or may not 
correspond with the sex assigned at birth”321. It is important to note here that transgender 
issues are considered to be issues of gender identity rather than sexual orientation. 
Differentiated policy solutions thus imply a Union that is attuned to the specific needs of 
lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, transsexuals, transgendered people, intersex people and 
other sexual minorities that are frequently collapsed under the heading ‘LGBT people’.
According to Swiebel, however, the real cause of the Union’s conceptual inconsistency 
can be found in its “lack of competence” to fully take transgender and other gender 
identity issues on board322. This explains why the Amsterdam Treaty, the Employment 
Directive and the Charter only apply the non-discrimination principle to sexual 
orientation. EU regulations also account for the fact that ILGA-Europe can only use 
Commission funding for its LGB-related advocacy and not for matters concerning gender 
identity323. In consideration of the FRA’s findings that attitudes towards transgender 
persons are significantly more negative compared to LGB people324 and that they might 
face very low acceptance by other LGBT people325, this legal imbalance is particularly 
321 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2009b), pp. 24-25
322 Swiebel, J. (2009), p. 25
323 Cf. Beger, N. J. (2004), p. 34
324 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2009b), p. 10
325 Ibid., p. 125
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distressing. That is to say, instead of paying due attention to a particularly vulnerable 
group, EU legislation makes transgender people more likely to being doubly 
marginalised.    
In fact, in the cases that the Union does address transgenderism, such as in the Recast 
Directive, this is done with respect to equal treatment and non-discrimination on the 
basis of sex. The Union’s provisions then only apply when the process of gender 
reassignment has been completed. According to a parliamentary policy paper, this 
covers only roughly ten percent of the transgender population326. By implication, this 
leaves a large number of people with a non-conforming gender identity in legal limbo. 
This is in spite of the FRA’s observation that “there is no reason not to extend the 
protection” to those transgendered persons that are currently not covered by EU 
legislation, including pre-operative transgender people, as well as those who are not 
willing or able to undergo gender reassignment, intersex people, and transvestites327. 
While the Union thus verbally proclaims to be a staunch advocate of LGBT people as a 
whole, its legal incapacity to adequately address the component of gender identity 
exposes such language as inherently flawed, revealing a gross mismatch between 
rhetoric and reality.
Correspondingly, European-level communications on sexual minority rights are 
conspicuously silent on issues concerning bisexuality. As Swiebel pointedly remarks, 
“bisexuality was simply ignored”328. There is an apparent “incompatibility of ‘sexual 
orientation’ with ‘bisexuality’”329 that is reflective of an assumed “naturalness of the 
homo-hetero binary”330. In other words, sexual orientation is reduced to either 
heterosexuality or homosexuality. In connection with EU-level LGBT politics, this 
effectively forces bisexuals in the Union to identify with, or conform to, one of these two 
categories in order to be recognised. 
Of relevance, because policy- and law-makers tend to define LGBT identities in 
essentialist terms, and therefore to compartmentalise them, people who do not associate 
with the conventional categories of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender generally lose 
326 Castagnoli, C. (2010), p. 5
327 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2009a), p. 131
328 Swiebel, J. (2009), p. 25
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out at the intersections. Some authors also argue that treating gay men and lesbian 
women in a conceptually equal manner is to deny the power relations and inherent 
tensions that exist between these two groups.  As the noted feminist Adrienne Rich 
reflects, “to equate lesbian existence with male homosexuality [...] is to erase female 
reality once again”331. This statement is corroborated by FRA’s social analysis, which 
reveals that lesbian and bisexual women generally endure discrimination to a greater 
extent than their male counterparts332. While Beger rightly observes that the belief that 
legal reality can accommodate the fluidity of sexual and gender identities is “a fantasy 
never to be fulfilled”333, and without trying to embark on a post-structuralist reading of 
LGBT politics at the level of the EU, this does illustrate anew the importance of bearing 
in mind the heterogeneity of the alleged LGBT ‘community’ as well as how political 
discourse is invariably informed by the politics of identity. 
 
A final, important conceptual contradiction concerns the relationship between 
Eurocentrism and cosmopolitanism. This already becomes clear from the LGBT toolkit, 
which is replete with references to EU documents as well as higher-ranking international 
human rights law. More precisely, even though European rhetoric contains many 
references to universal principles such as equality and non-discrimination, the accuracy 
of this universalism is questioned by some scholars. According to Kollman and Waites, 
“a key cost of the rigid universalism of the human rights lexicon is that it can impede 
dialogue, and risks being perceived as part of Western imperialism”334. Such perceptions 
of moralistic empire-building are clearly at odds with the operations of a legitimate NPE, 
which relies on diplomacy and persuasion rather than on “indoctrination and 
subjugation”335; a truly normative actor convinces third country representatives in a non-
coercive manner of the moral supremacy of its arguments.  
This is especially applicable when sexual minority rights are introduced into the 
international political arena, because of the contentiousness of sexual politics, especially 
in many non-Western settings, and because of the leading role that European 
institutions have played in defining “the rights of LGBT people as human rights”336. 
331 Rich, A. (1980), p. 649, as cited in Sheill, K. (2009a), p. 60
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Sexual minority rights are often perceived of as a specifically European social construct 
that is completely alien to many countries’ domestic culture. In this light, same-sex 
behaviour has sometimes been denounced as a “European”337 or “Western disease”338 
and LGBT rights activism has even resulted in a backlash in some countries339. Studies 
on Sub-Saharan Africa, India and Iran also reveal how the incompatibility of supposedly 
international LGBT rights norms with non-Western contexts can have a disempowering 
effect on sexual minorities340. Furthermore, the way in which these norms conceptualise 
the different components of ‘LGBT’ is insufficiently inclusive and heavily centred on the 
West. As Kollman and Waites claim, sexual minority rights thus potentially “curtail the 
recognition of many non-Western understandings of sexual behaviour and gender”341. 
Promoting LGBT rights through a cosmopolitan rhetoric runs the dual risk of further 
obscuring this power imbalance in defining sexual minority rights and of perpetuating the 
marginalisation of non-Western categories of sexual orientation and gender identity. This 
underlines the potentially paradoxical constraining impact of the politics of liberation and 
false universalism. The irony is thus that such a Western bias, whether real or perceived, 
will likely be strengthened by the Union’s universalising norm-setting objectives 
regarding LGBT rights. 
This dialectical tension between European values and universalism is reflective of a 
Habermasian paradox according to which “the common denominator for Europeanness 
is the universalist meaning of human rights”342; for a norm to be a norm propagated by 
the EU, it must be universal, which automatically erodes its uniquely European 
character. Consequently, even though the Union might present LGBT rights as universal 
human rights through making references to a plethora of cosmopolitan frameworks such 
as the UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR, the very fact that it must actively frame sexual 
minority rights as a universal issue in its external relations puts a question mark over this 
very universality and, by implication, suggests a more Eurocentric ethics.
In conclusion, the Union’s conceptualisation of LGBT people, and the way that this has 
been translated into actual policies, is fraught with disjunctures, definitional slippages 
337 Henderson, E. M. (2000), p. 38
338 Shah, N. (1998), p. 484
339 Long, 2005, as cited in Kollman & Waites, 2009, p. 7
340 See Seckinelgin (2009) on Sub-Saharan Africa and India, and Long (2009) on Iran.
341 Kollman, K. & Waites, M. (2009), p. 13
342 Beger, N. J. (2004), p. 80
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and omissions of definitions. These inconsistencies notwithstanding, several recent 
developments, most notably the launch of the LGBT toolkit, appear to constitute a 
significant turnabout. Especially promising are the toolkit’s clarification of terminology, its 
awareness that “transgender persons are a particularly vulnerable group within LGBT 
people”343 and the importance that it attaches to multilateral fora and cosmopolitan legal 
instruments. These suggest an awareness of the need to address the three forms of 
conceptual inconsistencies uncovered in this subsection, namely issues of definitional 
clarity, an inconsonant treatment of the different groups of LGBT people, and the tension 
between Eurocentrism and universalism. The Union will only be able to act as an 
effective and legitimate normative power in its relations with third countries if the volte-
face results in the proper handling of these critical points.
Instrumental Inconsistencies
A fourth and comparatively minor set of inconsistencies that should briefly be mentioned 
here concerns the nature of the policy tools that the Union has used in its external 
relations when it comes to the promotion and protection of LGBT rights. It thus refers 
back to the distinction between hard and soft policy instruments that is a defining feature 
of NPE. Issues of state sovereignty and limited competence naturally prevent EU actors 
from intervening directly in the human rights situation of sexual minorities. As a 
consequence, the Union’s involvement rarely extends beyond declaratory diplomacy and 
dialogue within which the presumed universalism of LGBT rights is consistently 
accentuated. The Parliament’s resolution on Uganda, which cannot do more than call 
on, remind and urge other authorities344, and the non-authoritarian character of the LGBT 
toolkit’s operational tools exemplify this. A critical reading of this would, much akin to Bull 
and Kagan’s original criticism of CPE, stress that cosmopolitan parlance is only resorted 
to because of the Union’s strategic disempowerment to act more forcibly. Proponents of 
NPE, on the other hand, would underscore the genuineness of the EU’s normative and 
universalist commitment. Nevertheless, the softness of the Union’s policy instruments in 
the case of sexual minority rights does resonate with the normative power thesis, if not 
by a morality-based volition then by legal constraints.
343 Council of the European Union (2010d)
344 European Parliament (2009c)
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Nonetheless, the critique of the Union’s normativity in its relations with neighbouring and 
partner countries should be recalled here. Of specific relevance is the argument that a 
third country’s compliance with the Union’s normative principle that LGBT rights are 
human rights is more the result of the size of the European market than of the moral 
persuasiveness of the EU’s arguments. In consideration of third actors’ structural 
dependency, declaring support for the Union’s values could thus be seen as a case of 
imperial politics “through various forms of economic and political domination”345. It is thus 
customary for partner countries, largely irrespective of which form such institutionalised 
partnership takes, to align themselves with EU foreign policy statements. 
For example, a number of candidate countries, potential candidates, countries of the 
Stabilisation and Association Process, members of the European Economic Area and 
the European Free Trade Association aligned themselves with the High Representative’s 
statement on the International Day against Homophobia and Transphobia that was 
referred to in the introduction of this paper346. The same holds true for the HR’s 
declaration on the human rights of LGBT people in Malawi347. Consequently, the 
importance of sexual minority rights is no longer represented as a unique concern of the 
EU, but as a deeply shared value that transcends the Union. As such, the idea’s alleged 
universalism is underlined.
This then begs the question to what extent these alignments mirror the voluntary 
internalisation of EU norms, or whether they are merely reflective of the impelling 
political requirements of partnership. Barbé et al.’s analysis of the ENP suggests the 
latter. In the case of Ukraine, they note that “alignment is mainly a political act of 
support” the low costs of which “are clearly offset by expectations of political rewards 
under the form of intensified political relations with the EU”348. Similar conclusions could 
be drawn with respect to alignment with the IDAHO-statement and the declaration on 
Malawi. Third countries’ economic and political dependency thus brings a hidden and 
subtle coercive logic into play. Because this is at odds with the Union’s cosmopolitanism-
infused normative rhetoric, the EU is unmasked as instrumentally conflicted. This echoes 
the conclusion of Scheipers and Sicurelli that “a closer look at what the EU does and 
345 Zielonka, J. (2008), p. 471
346 Council of the European Union (2010a)
347 Council of the European Union (2010b)
348 Barbé, E., Costa, O., Herranz, A. et al. (2009), p. 390
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what the EU achieves reveals that the EU is still far from playing the role of an effective 
normative power”349. In short, prima facie norm diffusion should not unquestionably be 
interpreted as an illustration of a successful Normative Power Europe, considering that 
norm adherence by third parties might be informed more by conventional realist 
arguments than by genuine morality.
349 Scheipers, S. & Sicurelli, D. (2008), p. 621
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5. Conclusion
“ [...] discrimination on the basis of gender and sexual orientation has ceased to 
constitute a political cleavage, and is enshrined in the EU’s founding act and 
statement of values. It is something that distinguishes Europe from many other parts 
of the world.”350
“The European Union rejects and condemns any manifestation of homophobia as 
this phenomenon is a blatant violation of human dignity. It considers that 
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity is 
incompatible with the basic principles on which the EU is founded”.351
“The EU is going to great lengths to combat homophobia in all its forms”.352
According to such self-representations, the normative basis of the European Union 
reflects how the Union’s member states and different institutional bodies unanimously 
reject unequal treatment and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and 
gender identity and are fully committed to upholding and promoting this unquestionably 
shared value, both internally and “in its relations with the wider world”353. As Swiebel 
reflects, this issue touches “the EU at the core of its soul”354, because it is inextricably 
connected to five of the Union’s nine fundamental values, namely associative human 
rights, the supranational role of law, inclusive equality, social solidarity and good 
governance355. Its normative ethics thus predisposes the Union to bring this self-ascribed 
moral ascendancy to bear on its external relations; ideational evangelism with respect to 
LGBT rights is the logically unavoidable outcome of the intersection between internal 
values and foreign policy objectives. 
This moral vanguardism is at once uniquely European and fundamentally universal. As a 
matter of illustration, while the anchoring of sexual minority rights in groundbreaking EU 
documents such as the Employment Directive, the Treaty of Lisbon and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights is invoked, international human rights instruments such as the 
350 European Council (2010)
351 Council of the European Union (2010a)
352 European Commission (2010a)
353 European Union (2008)
354 Swiebel, J. (2009), p. 30 
355 Cf. Manners, I. (2008)
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ICCPR, ICESCR and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child are 
drawn upon at the same time356. Such a juxtaposition of Europeanness and 
cosmopolitanism serves as a cushion against charges of moral imperialism. That is to 
say, it suggests that sexual minority rights are not a European social construct, but that 
the Union is merely leading the pack, as well as showing the way, in embedding its legal 
provisions in a higher-ranking law. 
Consequently, EU actors invariably refer to UN documents in their external 
communications with respect to LGBT rights. This is done in order to persuade third 
countries that the rights of people with a non-conforming sexual orientation or gender 
identity have already been firmly entrenched in UN covenants and declarations. 
Because the EU is itself a signatory to such nonpartisan documents, thus illustrating that 
it also “subjects its actions to the constraints of a higher ranking law”357, allegations of 
double talk and self-serving behaviour appear to be unfounded. 
Official grandiloquence therefore suggests that the Union’s external relations regarding 
the human rights of LGBT people should showcase all the hallmarks of Ian Manners’ 
Normative Power Europe; the EU seems to possess the potential “to define what passes 
for ‘normal’” when it comes to the global politics of sexual identity358. Such a tentative 
conclusion is based on the observation that the Union’s norm-setting activities in this 
issue area largely consist of declaratory politics and dialogue that are informed by 
cosmopolitan arguments, are promoted non-coercively, are made more credible by 
evidencing that the Union is itself committed to and bound by the principles that it 
propagates, and that are underpinned by supposedly altruistic motives. On the face of it, 
the EU is thus well-positioned to act as a normative power concerning LGBT rights.
Nonetheless, the concept’s validity is called into question by the review of the academic 
debate. Most generally, NPE has been attacked for its limited theoretical reflexivity and 
for having been insufficiently problematised. Some authors want to overcome this 
imperfect construction of normative power by developing clear standards of 
cosmopolitanism on the basis of which it can be evaluated359. Others question NPE’s 
356 Cf. Council of the European Union (2010a)
357 Eriksen, E. O. (2006), p. 265
358 Manners, I. (2002), p. 236
359 Cf. Eriksen, E. O. (2006) and Sjursen, H. (2006a), p. 244
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relevance by pointing to the ongoing militarisation of the Union. An important point of 
critique has been the alleged dominance of normative motives in driving EU policy. 
Authors such as Hyde-Price, Youngs and Bicchi have taken issue with this, emphasising 
instead the importance of strategic calculations and the desire to simply replicate the 
European experience abroad. In a similar vein, supposedly soft policy instruments have 
been unveiled as being far from purely ideational. Finally, Nicolaïdis and Howse have 
illustrated how the normative power argument is weakened considerably when the EU 
falls short of practising what it preaches, whereas other studies have revealed how 
internal fragmentation defies the image of a Union speaking and acting in unison. By 
uncovering the theoretical shortcomings of Manners’ framework, and by highlighting the 
consequences of an uncritical, non-reflexive engagement with his thesis, these studies 
thus raise several points of concern that should be incorporated into any empirical 
evaluation of “the ability to diffuse [...] norms on to the world stage” 360, which remains the 
true litmus test of the Union’s normative power.
In consideration of this, an overview of the LGBT-related policy landscape, with respect 
to both its internal and its external dimension, has revealed how the Union’s ability to 
project its sexual ethics into the international realm is severely hamstrung by a series of 
inconsistencies. Internally, even though European-level provisions should have created 
a situation of de jure equivalence with regards to the principles of equal treatment and 
non-discrimination, reports on the pervasiveness of institutionalised and societal homo- 
and transphobia showed how there is no de facto level-playing field; frontrunners and 
laggards can easily be distinguished in an internally fissured Union. On top of the 
ubiquity of discrimination, three member states opted out of the Charter, baring more 
divisions. Consequently, if the Union wants to promote LGBT rights abroad, such an 
imperfect domestic record invites charges of double talk. 
Institutionally, the Union’s hybrid set-up predisposes it to an organisational inability to 
speak with one voice. Here, positive evaluations of Parliament as “the most reliable ally 
for European NGOs in the advancement of social rights”361 need to be placed aside more 
mixed or even critical interpretations of the LGBT rights record of the Commission, 
Council and the Court of Justice. Such institutional incoherence is likely to have a 
360 Lightfoot, S. & Burchell, J. (2005), p. 80
361 Beger, N. J. (2004), p. 23
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disempowering effect on the Union’s efforts to promote and protect the human rights of 
LGBT people in its external relations.
At a conceptual level, it was found that the EU frequently lacks definitional clarity in its 
policies towards the different groups of LGBT people. Moreover, while the EU 
sometimes groups sexual orientation and gender identity together, on other occasions 
they are treated differentially. The Union’s approach to transgenderism and bisexuality is 
particularly inconsonant. Finally, it has been argued that “false universal claims” are 
embedded in the rhetoric that the Union employs in its efforts to promote LGBT rights as 
human rights362, revealing an inherent tension between Eurocentrism and 
cosmopolitanism. The EU thus manifests definitional omissions, practical inconsistencies 
and conceptual tensions in addressing sexual minority rights.
Finally, the poorness of fit between the Union’s moralistic rhetoric and the actual policy 
tools that it employs in its foreign policy, when it comes to the promotion and protection 
of sexual minority rights, is suggestive of instrumental incongruence. While third 
countries’ political alignments at first sight appear genuinely normative and unforced, 
they might in fact be triggered by a position of political and economic dependency rather 
than by an ideationally persuasive EU.
The combination of these internal, institutional, conceptual and instrumental 
inconsistencies produces a dissonance in the Union’s external relations that has a 
crippling effect on the EU’s ability to shape international norms and values. These 
schisms directly call into question the Union’s credibility, which, by implication, corrodes 
its authority in international affairs. Failing to rectify this inconsonance would reflect, as 
well as reinforce, a “crusading, messianic and imperialist mentality” that is irreconcilable 
with other states’ “conceptions of the ‘good’”363. Because a truly normative actor relies 
upon the compelling integrity and righteousness of its values, the Other’s perception of 
the Union’s policies of “subjugation and indoctrination”364 would clearly be at odds with 
Manners’ thesis. Simply put, an international actor that is internally divided, both at the 
organisational and the member state level, and whose policies are full of chinks and 
irregularities is ill-positioned to persuade others of the rectitude of its standards. 
362 Kollman, K. & Waites, M. (2009), p. 11
363 Hyde-Price, A. (2008), p. 42
364 Zielonka, J. (2008), p. 484
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This holds true especially for highly contentious topics such as sexual orientation and 
gender identity; because LGBT rights are often perceived to be alien to the domestic and 
political cultures of many states outside the EU, these rights require passionate and 
irreproachable normative leadership in order to establish an international consensus that 
cosmopolitan law and the human rights situation of LGBT people are inseparable. 
Currently, because it is riddled with incongruence, the EU is not fully qualified to take up 
this role. This is not to say that the Union possesses no ethical influence whatsoever 
with regard to sexual minority rights or that it should refrain from promoting its normative 
principle of LGBT rights as human rights abroad until the asymmetry between rhetoric 
and reality has been remedied. It merely points out how such a plethora of solecisms 
weakens the sway of the EU’s moral reasoning, the upshot of which is more likely to be 
normative paralysis than normative power.
These sobering conclusions notwithstanding, recent policy developments are a cause for 
optimism, albeit of a cautious kind, in evaluating the fit between normative power and the 
Union’s advancement of sexual minority rights in third countries. The Council’s Toolkit to 
Promote and Protect the Enjoyment of all Human Rights by Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and 
Transgender (LGBT) People possesses the potential to overcome the majority of the 
inconsistencies that currently have an enervating effect on the Union’s foreign policy on 
sexual minorities: it constitutes a policy instrument that is to be used across the EU’s 
institutions and member states, it stresses non-coercive policy tools such as 
multilateralism and civil society dialogue, it is attuned to the particular vulnerability of 
transgender people and women, and it provides conceptual and definitional clarity. 
Above all, the toolkit underscores the primacy of cosmopolitanism with references to UN 
documents, statements and covenants. Through such an emphasis on the universal 
nature of LGBT rights, the Union could try to build on its global efforts to abolish the 
death penalty, where it also “frequently stresses international agreements as the basis of 
its policy” and where it seeks to further institutionalise and legalise human rights 
norms365. By founding its rights-based norm-setting behaviour upon the blueprint offered 
by the death penalty case, which is generally seen as archetypal of Europe’s normative 
365 Lerch, M. & Schwellnus, G. (2006), p. 309
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influence366, the toolkit thus has the potential to equip the Union with the self-binding 
moral framework, and the ideational tools that are prerequisite of acting as a full-fledged 
normative power. 
Because it was only launched in June 2010, and has not yet fully been worked out, the 
instrument is now merely emblematic of embryonic normativity. On top of this, the 
Council initiative is not binding. Future research will thus have to closely monitor its 
development in order to see whether the toolkit can fulfil its promise of increasing the 
EU’s normative strength in promoting and protecting the human rights of LGBT people in 
the EU’s external action. Until such potential materialises, however, the role of the Union 
in this policy field is best summarised as that of a conflicted normative power.
366 Cf. Manners, I. (2002) and  Lerch, M. & Schwellnus, G. (2006)
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